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SUMMARY
The analysis of some of the problems associated with teaching mathe­
matics to science students provided in this thesis is a philosophical 
one, and as such claims to clarify rather than solve these problems.
An important aspect of the thesis is the criticisms it offers of the 
philosophical and methodological assumptions underlying research 
within educational technology. In particular, the attempt to state 
the end point of educational processes in terms of precise statements 
of behaviour has been criticised, not by suggesting that there are 
other, non-observable (i.e. mental) outcomes, but by demonstrating 
that the intended behaviours cannot be stated in advance.
This criticism has been based on Wittgenstein’s analysis of under­
standing, which Wittgenstein calls a ’grammatical’ analysis since, 
crudely, it consists of looking at how words are used. The purpose 
of the analysis, in this thesis, has been to show that educational 
technologists, in looking for behaviour corresponding to understanding, 
have misunderstood the use of the word ’understanding’.
The context for the discussion of understanding has been provided by 
Kuhn’s view of the nature of science and the analysis has been linked 
With Wittgenstein’s criticism of the traditional notion of a concept 
since this has a bearing on assumptions made about what is learnt 
in the mathematics class and taken over into the science class. This 
analysis if accepted, demonstrates that in order to study the problems 
associated with mathematics for science courses, one cannot specify, 
in behavioural terms, what the student must transfer.. Instead, and 
this is the main conclusion of the thesis, one must look at the criteria 
for understanding used in the two subjects.
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PROLOGUE
Introduction
The aim of my research has been to investigate the problems associated 
with teaching mathematics to science students. This thesis is the 
result of this investigation. At first, my investigations were 
empirical: I was closely associated with various educational innovations 
in the teaching of mathematics. The purpose of my concern with these 
innovations was largely two-fold: first, I hoped to gain experience 
in ways of assessing the effects of innovations and thus gain deeper 
insight into the specific problems associated with teaching mathematics 
to science students. Second, it seemed that it might be possible to 
recommend a way of teaching mathematics to science students based on 
one or other of these innovations.
It was through my involvement with such projects, and through my
£
attempts to find ways of assessing their Effects on other parts of 
the students' course, that I came to realise that a more general in­
vestigation, not related to a specific course or institution, was 
necessary. Further thought convinced me that before empirical solutions 
to the problems associated with teaching mathematics to science students 
could be obtained, various philosophical problems would need to be 
carefully examined. Therefore, this thesis has become a discussion 
of these philosophical issues. Nonetheless, a brief account of early 
work on the practical projects will serve as a starting point for the 
discussions that follow:
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(a) A Calculus course for ex-arts students
Several science and engineering departments of the University of Surrey 
used to offer four year honours courses, called B courses, for students 
with a predominantly arts background. (These B courses were dis­
continued in June 1973, due to falling student numbers.) The first 
year was an introductory year to prepare students for the normal 
three year honours course, and covered large parts of an "A” level 
physics and mathematics course. While one or two of the students 
had done "A” level mathematics, the majority had only done M0" level, 
often some time previously. Prior to 1971 the mathematics had been 
taught by an orthodox lecture system. However, in an attempt to 
cope with the differing backgrounds and speed of working of the 
various students, this was replaced, in October 1971, by a Keller 
plan system. ’
A Keller plan course is one in which the course material is divided 
into units, each of about a week’s work, which the students are 
expected to work through by themselves. Each unit contains a list 
of objectives which the students are expected to achieve, references 
to a text book (in this case, the main text was ’Quick Calculus1, 
a programme text by Kleppner and Ramsey), additional notes, examples 
and problems, and also a short test based on the objectives. The 
student, after working through the material in the unit, has to pre­
sent himself for a test when he feels he has mastered this material.
He is only allowed onto the next unit when he has passed the test 
for the previous unit, equivalent tests being available if the student 
fails at the first attempt.
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As well as acting as a tutor on this course, where I was able to gain 
first hand experience of the sorts of problems encountered by students 
of low mathematical ability, I was also engaged in research aimed at 
comparing a Keller type course with an ordinary lecture course.
Various aspects of my research were: to identify particular difficulties 
students had with the material 'in the units, to record students pro­
gress through the units and to assess students* reactions to the 
course. I was also able to assess longer term effects, of insisting 
on mastery of objectives for each unit, by means of an end of^course 
examination. This examination consisted of two parts: part A con­
tained short questions similar to those in the unit tests, part B 
contained four longer questions, from which the student had to answer 
one. The questions in part B were all based on the material taught 
in the course, but required some application. It was found that the 
number of units covered in the course proved a good predictor of how 
well students performed in part A, thus suggesting that the achieve­
ment of the unit objectives ensured a certain minimum standard.
However, there was no similar relation between units passed in the 
course and performance on part B of the examination, and this might 
suggest that achieving course objectives does not necessarily establish, 
what might be thought to be, a higher level of understanding. The 
question remains as to whether it is possible to produce objectives 
which would ensure this understanding.
(b) Kings College - Calculus Crash Course
The calculus crash course at Kings College, London, was started in 
the academic year 1970- 1971. Prior to this there had been a "Maths 
for Biologists" course. Following a decline in the mathematical 
standards of entrants, the chemistry and engineering departments of 
Kings College decided to start a remedial programme, and this was
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amalgamated with the Maths for Biologists course. I became involved 
with the course in its second year. The arrangements, which differed 
from those in the first year, were that the course was held all day 
on each of the first six Wednesdays of term. Students for the course 
from the chemistry and engineering departments, were selected on the 
basis of their performance in a shortened version of the PIP Pre­
knowledge test (see later, for further details), that was given to 
all first year students in these departments. Those students scoring 
less than 60%, and all biology students, attended the course.
The text used was 1 Quick Calculus1 by Kleppner and Ramsey. This 
was divided into six, approximately equal sections, one section to 
be covered in each of the morning sessions. The morning sessions 
lasted from about 10.00 to 13.00 with free coffee at about 11.00.
The atmosphere was very informal: tables were arranged in groups, 
staff and tutors were introduced by their first names and discussions 
with tutors or friends was encouraged. The afternoon sessions had 
no set text and consisted of films or demonstrations followed by 
discussion. For the afternoon sessions the attendance was optional 
and none of the work was examined.
In the seventh week the students were given a test, similar to the 
test they had taken at the beginning of the term, but with one im­
portant difference from the first test: namely that students were 
allowed as much time as they liked, whereas in the first test students 
were only given an hour. (Many students had complained about the lack 
of time in the previous test, especially those that had arrived late.) 
The extra time allowed was certainly one factor in the improved per­
formance in the second test, where all the chemistry and engineering 
students achieved over 60%. Even so, I think that the results still
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demonstrate an improvement in the students’ performance.
Another aim of the course was to change students’ attitudes to mathe­
matics, and part of my evaluation was to measure! the extent to which 
this had been achieved,, I therefore designed and gave out a question­
naire which I hoped would measure attitudes to calculus and to mathe­
matics in general. This questionnaire produced some predictable 
results, such as: that engineering students considered mathematics 
more important and more relevant to their main subject than did 
chemistry students, who in their turn considered it more important 
and relevant than did biology students. The questionnaire also con­
firmed the general impression I had that students had enjoyed the 
course, and that this was.because of the easy and informal atmosphere, 
the approachability of the staff and because students were able to 
work at their own speed. However, it is difficult to ascertain whether 
this positive attitude to the course had any long-term effect on the 
students’ attitude towards mathematics, and whether it in any way 
changed students’ behaviour.
(c) Physics Interface Project
The Physics Interface Project (PIP) was set up by the six universities 
of Cardiff, Chelsea, Keele, Birmingham,. Surrey and York to investigate 
the problems arising from the transition between school and university. 
One of its tasks was to measure the mathematical abilities of the 
student intake into each of the physics departments. It was a generally 
held opinion that physics students were experiencing difficulties with 
their mathematics and also that this might be in part due to a decline 
in the mathematical standards of student entrants. Therefore, a test 
was needed to verify that the mathematical ability of science students 
was poor and to discover the extent of the deficiencies in students.
It took the form of a multiple choice test covering all the mathematical
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skills considered to be necessary pre-knowledge for a.physics degree 
course and it was given to all first year entrants in each of the 
physics departments involved in the scheme.
The results showed that there were several topics, supposedly covered 
at ”A" level, in which the performance of a large number of students 
was inadequate. Having demonstrated this, the next step was to 
remedy these deficiencies. One suggestion was that I should prepare 
a number of programmed packages covering these topics, and that these 
packages would be given to those students failing corresponding 
questions on the pre-knowledge test.
When preparing these packages, the first problem I had was to find 
a suitable way of presenting the topics. The information obtainable 
from the test answers was limited and merely indicated that a certain 
number of students had failed to answer certain questions but not why. 
The questions tested mathematical skills and had been designed 
specifically with a physics degree course in mind. I therefore 
thought it inappropriate to treat the topics in the same way that 
they would have been treated in an "A" level mathematics course, 
but instead tried to teach just the mathematical skill. Therefore 
I first produced an analysis of how I thought a person might go about 
answering a question of the type given in the pre-knowledge test.
The analysis was then the basis for a programme that tried to teach 
students how to answer such a question.
A small pilot study was carried out on a group of sixth form pupils 
of mixed ability so as to identify any difficulties students might 
have, due to ambiguities and poor explanations in the text. Several 
students commented that the programmes had been useful in clarifying
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several points with which they had previously found difficult. It 
vvas not possible to further validate the packages prior to their use 
since I was unable to obtain a large group of representative students. 
To compensate for this I prepared pre- and post-tests which I had 
intended students taking the packages to attempt in order to obtain 
a measure of the successfulness of the programmes. However, due to 
various factors outside of my control, this was also not possible 
and so I was unable to evaluate the programmes.
Review of the Literature
It is so generally accepted that there are problems associated with 
the teaching of mathematics to science students, that no references 
are required to substantiate this. I carried out a review of the 
literature with the purpose of finding out what research had been 
done on this problem, but was unable to find an account of any systematic 
research. The bulk of the literature consisted of descriptions of 
new approaches to teaching particular topics or descriptions of new 
syllabuses. To the best of my knowledge, these innovations were not 
the result of a systematic analysis of the problem nor were they 
followed by an evaluation of their effects. This finding that re­
flects the lack of systematic work in the area suggests, I think, 
that innovations are normally based on a teacher’s new idea or desire 
to teach a topic in a particular way, that there is little concern 
for evaluation and that there is a real difficulty in knowing what 
and how to evaluate. A more useful type of article that also appeared 
in the literature was written by the person, experienced in the 
teaching of mathematics to science students, giving his own personal 
opinion, in the light of reflection on these experiences, as to the
cause of the problems and some ways they could be remedied.
A report, that does not fall into any of the above categories, entitled 
’University Training in Mathematics for the Future Physicist’, prepared 
for the International Congress of Mathematicians (International 
Congress of Mathematicians 1966) was useful for describing the state 
of mathematics teaching in the majority of physics departments, in 
the U.K., just prior to 1966. The report was prepared by analysing 
the results of a questionnaire circulated to physics departments of 
Universities and Colleges of Advanced Technology. According to the 
report, the mathematics that is taught to physics students is ’’some­
times regarded as a separate subsidiary subject and sometimes as an 
integral part of the physics course, but the distinction between 
these two is mainly administrative” (p. 2). There were no institutions 
where the mathematics teaching was done entirely by physicists, and 
in those cases where physicists taught some of the mathematics, it 
was generally courses such as classical mechanics and methods of 
mathematical physics. Therefore in the majority of institutions, 
according to this report, all or some of the mathematics teaching 
was ’’service teaching”. The report goes on to draw attention to the 
difference in outlook between the mathematicians and the physicists.
The writers of the report suggest that for ’’the physicist, mathematics 
is a tool, and it will be more attractive to the student if he is 
clear from the outset what kind of purpose each tool has been designed 
to serve”. :
It must be pointed out that this report concerns only mathematics 
for physics students, and not scientists in general. Also in the 
eight years since it was written there seems to have developed a 
greater appreciation of the role mathematics plays in science. For
example, Elton suggests that "mathematics is more than a mere tool 
to the scientist. Furthermore, as a language it is different from 
that used by the mathematician, when dealing with mathematics.”
(Elton 1971, p.77) He goes on to quote Bondi, who unfortunately 
uses the term tool both in the way in which Elton uses it, and to 
refer to the role of mathematics as a language. Nonetheless, it is 
still possible to see that Elton is suggesting the same as Bondi:
"I use mathematics as a tool in two ways. First in 
the specialised way that the particular manipulative 
skills and ability to handle certain types of data 
are greatly helped by the particular kind of mathe­
matical education I have received, and second, in 
the way that the abstract ways of thinking which 
arise naturally in mathematics, are very often of
use in the less familiar fields of science where
we deal with knowledge gained from conditions far 
removed from those of everyday life."
(quoted from Bondi 1966)
As Bruckheimer and Gowar point out: "There is an all too prevalent 
view, both within and without many educational establishments, that 
mathematics is merely part of an engineer's tool-hit" (Bruckheimer 
and Gowar, 1968). Flegg also points out that, in his opinion "the 
users have done themselves and their subject a disservice whenever 
they have approached mathematics purely from a conventional user 
point of view - the 'mathematics as a tool’ approach" (Flegg, 1974 
p. 66). Flegg goes on to suggest, a little later in the same article,
that to "assume that a facility with mathematical techniques is all
that is required as the end-product of a 'mathematics for science' 
course, is to presume at the same time that the mathematical models 
used in science and technology have nothing to offer to the under­
standing of the physical situations which they are used to represent. 
This is to make a presupposition which is entirely unjustified." (p. 68)
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Skellam, in an interesting article on teaching mathematics to biologists 
suggests three features of a healthy relationship between mathematics 
and science: "1. Language is the vehicle by means of which knowledge 
finds expression and through which it is communicated. 2. Mathematical 
systems can be regarded, if we so wish, as rational languages in 
skeletal outline. 3. Empirical science aims at developing a coherent 
body of reliable knowledge and rational understanding through the 
systematisation of sense-experience." (Skellam 1972, p. 147) Thus we 
can see that there is a body of opinion, of which the above are examples 
to the effect that mathematics is more than a tool for manipulating 
data in science, but also is used as a language to model the physical 
situations with which the scientist is dealing.
There has also been some discussion as to how to solve the problems
associated with teaching mathematics to science students. The most
common suggestion is for the mathematics to be taught by a joint team
of mathematicians and scientists. Elton points out that:
”.....until recently the standard pattern in the
teaching of mathematics to others has been that it 
has been conducted by mathematicians who sometimes 
had and sometimes had not found out beforehand what 
the non-mathematicians required them to teach. The 
unsatisfactory nature of this has long been recognised 
and has led in some instances to the mathematics teach­
ing being taken over by mathematicians who had trans­
ferred their activities and their allegiance to the 
non-mathematician’s field - theoretical physicists, 
mathematical economists, etc. This too is unsatisfactory, 
since it tends to result in ad hoc syllabuses that lack 
generality. At last, the realisation is dawning.....
that what is needed is a collaboration on equal terms 
between the two sides......Ideally, it should be done
through team teaching and, failing that, the mathe­
matician who has transferred his allegiance to the 
non-mathematician’s field, may be a suitable go-between.”
(Elton 1971, p. 78) 
Mathews and Seed, when discussing the*relationship between mathematics 
and science in schools,, conclude by advocating that:
”(i) Mathematicians and scientists should meet 
together more often to discuss common problems
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and possible areas where an integrated approach 
would be fruitful. (ii) Some timetable provisions 
should be made at all levels for such inter­
disciplinary work, which might well take the form 
of modules or projects and involve some degree of 
team teaching."
(Mathews and Seed 1970, p.2 )
As Flegg points out, this is the sort of approach that has been adopted 
by the Open University, where a course in ’Elementary Mathematics for 
Science and Technology’ has been produced by a course team consisting 
of pure and applied mathematicians, scientists, technologists and 
an educationalist. Sellars (Sellars 1972) has also spoken of the 
need for liaison and co-operation between mathematics and science 
departments.
However, although there are various demands in the literature for 
team teaching, there appears to have been little detailed discussion 
on how these teams are going to collaborate. It is implied that the 
content of a mathematics course can be decided by a discussion between 
mathematics and scientists, but as Malvern points out:
”.....to restrict discussion of teaching order or
teaching approach solely to .a consideration of 
content seems short-sighted. Some consideration 
of the learner, and of the kind of processes 
involved in learning two closely related subjects 
is necessary. It is generally agreed that there 
is usually little transfer between these subjects 
without some elaborate prompting...... It is
not sufficient, for example, to draw the students’ 
attention to the sameness of a given topic when 
it re-appears in a physics lesson after being 
taught in the mathematics course. Even where an 
’efficient’ liaison exists between departments 
there may still be problems.”
(Malvern 1971, pp 1-2) 
Nonetheless, despite having said this, Malvern goes on to reduce 
these problems to organisational ones. Also, he does not appear to 
appreciate the role that mathematics plays as a language, and argues
solely in terms of responses to stimuli;
".....it seems likely that a high degree of transfer 
can be achieved when both subject teachers expect 
the same kind of answers to similar questions."
(Malvern 1971, p. 3)
As I shall discuss in greater detail later, this may well be true when 
mathematics is used as a tool, but it does not apply when mathematics 
is being used as a language.
I think it is fair to summarise the literature by saying that it is 
generally recognised that there are problems associated with teaching 
mathematics to science students, but there has been little systematic 
research into the causes of the problems, and, as far as I know, 
none at university level. Research that has been done, for example 
by Bajpai and his colleagues at Carnet (see, for example, Bajpai et al. 
1970 and Bajpai 1972), has been concerned with developing alternative 
ways of teaching certain topics, often using multi-media approaches.
The consensus that emerges from general articles is that problems 
have been caused by treating mathematics as a tool that is used by 
the scientist and ignoring its role as a language. There is also 
agreement on the need for co-operation.between mathematicians and 
scientists. However, no-one has appeared to consider the way in which 
team teaching will bring about a solution of the problems arising 
from mathematics being used as a language, rather than simply as a 
tool, in science.
In addition to the specific literature on the teaching of mathematics 
there is also a large body of more general educational literature 
that is more or less relevant to the issues of this thesis. Much 
recent work, on learning problems, has been carried out in educational
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technology. However, unfortunately, for reasons we shall consider 
later, such work has as its basis the formulation of precise state­
ments of behaviour. This naturally favours the teaching of skills 
and so, if applied to the problems associated with teaching mathe­
matics to science students, would lay emphasis on the use of mathe­
matics as a tool rather than as a language. Later in the thesis 
we shall come across, what I take to be, fairly representative samples 
of this literature, and I will analyse the contribution of such 
literature to our problems. At this stage there is, I feel, little 
to be gained by a prior description of the literature.
Discussion
The experience of both Kings College and the PIP universities provide 
evidence to support the claim that the mathematical abilities of
ccAe.
students unsatisfactory. One possible reason for this is the 
general shift away from science, resulting in university departments 
having to accept students with poorer mathematics ”An levels. If, 
in fact, a significant proportion of the student intake is of low 
mathematical ability, then remedial programmes at the beginning of 
a university course may well be giving more work to those students 
who are already having difficulty in coping with their work load. 
Hence it may be that a major re-structuring of teaching, and a cut­
back in the material a student is expected to cover, is required. 
However, the consideration of such a proposal is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.
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Although the two remedial programmes I studied presented their material 
in different ways, there was nonetheless a similarity in the sort 
of material they presented. Both the Kings College course and the 
PIP programmes were intended to teach students to do something, such 
as integrate, differentiate, sketch graphs, etc. The Kings College 
course did try to go beyond this.by also considering students’ at­
titudes, but on the whole, skills were being taught in both cases, 
as is shown by the use of similar tests. Although the skills tested 
by the PIP pre-knowledge test would appear to be necessary prerequisits 
for the use of mathematics as a tool, to the best of my knowledge 
there has been no test developed to measure whether a student is 
able to use mathematics as a language.
Now, it is often thought that students experience difficulty with 
their mathematics in science courses because they have failed to 
transfer what they learnt in their mathematics class to their science 
class. However before we can talk about a ’transference problem’, 
we must be clear about what, if anything is being ’transferred*.
The answer we give will, I suggest, depend on whether the mathematics 
is being used simply as a tool or whether it is also being used as 
a language. If only the first of these roles is fulfilled, then, 
the transference problems may be studied by isolating the particular 
skills that are necessary and devising tests to measure these skills.
However, I do not think problems arise just through the failure to 
transfer skill in the use of mathematical tools, from the mathematics 
to the science class. It is often the case, for example, that students 
can follow each stage of a mathematical argument in science, thus 
showing that they can use the tools, yet are still left with a feel­
ing of uncertainty. This is, I think, because the student lacks
-14-
an understanding of mathematics as a language. When.mathematics 
is used as a language the transference problem becomes more complex.
It is obvious what is meant when we talk of transfering a skill from 
one subject to another, we can readily see that the same skill is 
being used in two different sets of circumstances. But, what is 
meant by ’transfering understanding’? This, as we shall see, is 
not simply a matter of defining ’understanding’.
When mathematics is used as a language, as well as a took, the 
suggestion to teach the mathematics as part of the science course, 
rather than as a separate subject, has major drawbacks. If the 
mathematics is used simply as a tool, then the transference problem 
may be solved by integrating it into the science course, since the 
student will immediately see the relevance of the mathematics, will 
know why he is learning it and how it is used. Such a situation 
arises, for example, in psychology and sociology where statistical 
theories do not, in general, model the phenomena, but are used as 
tools to enable the mass of data to be handled. Statistics could 
therefore be taught as an integral part of the main course and this 
would avoid students having to learn statistics in abstract situations 
that bear no relation to the real situations in which it is normally 
used. If however, the mathematics is used as a language to model 
the phenomena being studied, then the above approach is in many ways 
analogous to teaching language from a phrase book. As Elton suggests 
(see above) this leads to ad hoc syllabuses that lack generality; 
the student can manage in those situations for which he has learnt 
appropriate phrases, but without grammatical rules, he cannot gener­
alise to other situations. This is probably even more serious for 
mathematics than for a natural language, since the mathematics will 
lack any of the overall structure which is its most significant
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feature, and which distinguishes it from all other languages.
An alternative way of considering the transference problem, which 
at first sight appears to avoid some of the problems associated 
with understanding, is in terms of concepts. One understands a 
language when one has grasped the concepts of the language; similarly 
we suggest that in order to understand the language of mathematics 
students need to learn the concepts of mathematics. In this way 
we can reformulate the problem of transference by saying that, in 
his mathematics classes, a science student learns both skills and 
concepts, and that these then have to be applied in the science 
class. This suggests that the transference of concepts is similar 
to the transference of skills, for, just as the same skill can be 
isolated from different situations, we are suggesting that a con­
cept can likewise be recognised and isolated in different situations. 
A similarity between concepts and skills is implicit in the way we 
talk about ’grasping1 and ’applying’ concepts. If our reformulation 
is valid, then it suggests that the transference problem, whether 
it involves skills or concepts, can be tackled by evaluating the 
learning of skills or concepts in the mathematics class, and measur­
ing the extent to which transference occurs.
Conclusion
As can be seen, my early work into the problems associated with 
teaching mathematics to science students was empirical. I was con­
cerned, directly or indirectly, with devising new methods of teaching,
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with specifying precise objectives to describe what a student needed 
to learn, with devising tests to measure these objectives, and with 
producing attitude questionnaires to assess what science students 
felt about mathematics. It might be thought that such an empirical 
approach would eventually yield solutions, or at least partial 
solutions to the problems, and indeed, this is one of the assumptions 
underlying educational technology. In spite of this, I became 
increasingly dissatisfied with an empirical approach and abandoned 
it in favour of what might be called a philosophical investigation.
It- is clearly necessary to give some justification for this. How­
ever, no short explanation can be entirely satisfactory, and in a 
sense, my entire thesis is an attempt at such a justification. At 
this stage, I can only outline some of the reasons for my dissatis­
faction with my early work.
First, I was concerned that mathematics is, in general, considered 
in isolation from the science in which it is used. Even where a 
statement of aims of a mathematics for science course is based on 
an analysis of the science course, the mathematics is subsequently 
taught in isolation from the science ex nek . it is difficult
to assess the effect that the mathematics course has on students’ 
work in the science course. Second, although there were several 
suggestions, in the literature, that mathematics is used as a 
language in science, I could find no further analysis of this role, 
nor any discussion of how this insight into the role of mathematics 
might affect the teaching of mathematics for science. Third, I was 
unhappy about the almost exclusive concern with behavioural objectives 
within educational technology which I have briefly mentioned, and the
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assumption, without any attempt, to my mind, to justify it, that 
all talk of understanding could he given a more precise expression 
in terms of specific behaviour. Although I appreciated the useful­
ness of behavioural objectives, I could not accept these extravagant 
claims that were being made.
What I felt was, not that a philosophical investigation could solve 
the problems associated with teaching mathematics to science students, 
but that such an investigation was necessary, prior to an empirical 
solution. This is because, I think that there are problems of a 
philosophical nature, that invariably arise when we try to attempt 
an empirical solution. For example, supposing we assume that the 
problems, or at least some of them, associated with teaching mathe­
matics to science students, arise because the students fail to trans­
fer their learning from the mathematics class. The empirical approach 
that appears to be called for, is to measure what has been learnt 
in the mathematics class/measure what is known in Athe science class 
and thus find out how much has been transferred. However, sooner 
or later, we shall come to the question: how do we measure under­
standing? Further, if it is understanding that is being transferred, 
is it meaningful to speak of ’something* being transferred at all? 
These questions are not empirical ones, they are philosophical ones.
I am well aware that the above argument will, in all probability, 
fail to convince someone committed to an empirical solution to 
educational problems. Such a person will probably accept that there 
are difficulties associated with his empirical approach, but that 
these are practical difficulties, which it is his job to remove. 
Unfortunately, he will not easily be dissuaded from this view, since
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no empirical investigation will convince him that his difficulties 
necessarily arise out of the nature of his empirical approach. What 
is needed is a philosophical argument; but it is just this sort of 
argument whose necessity the person denies’ Consequently, my above 
comments are not intended to, nor could they be expected to, force 
such a person to revise his opinion. Rather, it is the purpose of 
the thesis as a whole to do this. Therefore, I suggest that the 
thesis as a whole is read before any judgement is passed as to whether 
I was justified in undertaking a philosophical investigation, bear­
ing in mind, at the same time, that the results of a philosophical 
investigation cannot be the same as, nor a substitute for, the 
results of an empirical investigation.
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MATHEMATICS AND SCIENCE
1.1 A View of Science
There is, as we have seen, a growing realisation that mathematics 
is not simply used as a tool in science, but also as a language.
One consequence of this, as regards the teaching of mathematics, is 
that the mathematics should not be treated in isolation from the 
science. Although it is, to some extent, possible to isolate the 
mathematics teaching, where the mathematics is used as a tool, this 
is not possible where it is used as a language. Instead we must 
explore the relationship between mathematics and science.
One question that must be considered is whether the function of 
mathematics as a language differs according to the particular science 
we are concerned with, that is, we must consider whether there are 
any fundamental differences between the various sciences, or whether 
one particular science is a model for all. Thus our investigation 
is concerned with the philosophy of science. Kuhn, in his book 
’The Structure of Scientific Revolutions’ (Kuhn, 1970) approaches 
the philosophy of science from the history and sociology of science, 
and suggests that there are fundamental differences between different 
sciences. Each science is based on its own particular paradigm 
and a science such as physics, for example, cannot be considered 
as the example of what science ought to be like. Although Kuhn’s 
work is still the subject of much debate in the philosophy of science,
I think that this does not affect its significance for science education. 
This claim will, I hope, be borne out in this chapter.
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One of Kuhn’s main theses is that the popular view of science as 
an evergrowing stockpile of knowledge cannot be supported by histor­
ical evidence. Although much of science is directed towards cumu­
lative development, and this research Kuhn calls ’Normal Science', 
in contrast to this there are times when research is directed towards 
overthrowing previously accepted ways of viewing the world. Thus 
Kuhn replaces the picture of science as a cumulative progression, 
with a picture of science progressing through a. series of revolutions 
each followed by periods of normal science. The significance of 
this is that, although old scientific theories are discarded, they 
cannot be considered as being, in any way, unscientific. Therefore, 
Kuhn suggests, historians of science must accept the fact that science 
has included bodies of belief that are incompatible with the ones 
held today, and that there must, consequently, be an element of 
arbitrariness in the beliefs that are held today.
When working within a community of social scientists, Kuhn noted 
that there was considerable discussion about, and disagreement over, 
the nature of the scientific problems and the methods of social 
science. This does not occur in the physical sciences, where there 
is, in general, widespread agreement over fundamentals. This agree­
ment has not, however, always been a feature of the physical sciences, 
and Kuhn therefore set himself the problems of discovering what it 
is that transforms several competing schools into a unified field, 
in which the practitioners accept the same underlying view of the 
■world."
Central to Kuhn's solution to this problem, is the concept of a 
’paradigm', which Kuhn, at one stage, describes as: "universally 
recognised scientific achievements that for a time provide model
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problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.” (jKuhn 1970, 
p. viii). Thus the classics of science such as Aristotle’s Physica, 
Newton's Principia and Opticks, etc., "served for a time implicitly 
to define the legitimate problems and methods of a research field 
for succeeding generations of practitioners." (p. 10). Since the 
nineteenth Century textbooks, which "expound the body of accepted 
theory, illustrate many or all of its successful applications, and 
compare these applications with exemplary observations and experi­
ments" (p. 10), have served the same purpose. Therefore, normal 
science is research that is firmly based on a paradigm. Although 
scientific achievements become paradigms because they are success­
ful in solving a particular problem or group of problems, they are. 
never completely successful, nor do they solve all problems. Rather, 
the paradigm is a promise of future success. Thus normal science 
"consists in the actualization of that promise, an actualization 
achieved by extending the knowledge of those facts that the paradigm 
displays as particularly revealing, by increasing the extent of the 
match between those facts and the paradigm’s predictions, and by 
further articulation of the paradigm itself.” (p. 24) This fmop- 
up work1, as Kuhn calls it, does not aim atj^novelt/es (p.3s).
Nonetheless, occasionally problems arise which appear to be capable 
of being solved by the paradigm, but which resist all attempts at 
solution. In time several such anomalies can lead to a period of 
what Kuhn calls ’Revolutionary science’, in which the old paradigm 
becomes increasingly unacceptable to a small group of scientists 
within a field. A new paradigm is looked for, and if one is found 
which is successful in removing the anomalies, and also promises 
to be as useful as the old paradigm in explaining other phenomena, 
it is eventually accepted by the majority of scientists within the
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field. Thus, according to Kuhn, revolutions occur in science when 
a new paradigm replaces an older one, and this is accompanied by 
a basic shift in beliefs and committments.
The notion of a paradigm is clearly fundamental to Kuhn's work, and 
therefore it is necessary to clear up the confusions that resulted 
from Kuhn’s use of this term. In the postscript to the second edition - 
of his book, Kuhn discusses these difficulties. One of Kuhn’s students, 
Masterman (Masterman 1970) isolated twenty-two different ways in which 
the term paradigm was used. These differences were largely due to 
stylistic inconsistencies, but nonetheless, three distinct meanings 
can be isolated. The first of these is what Masterman calls the 
’sociological’ meaning where a shared paradigm is used to define 
a group of scientists. As Kuhn states in the postscript, this use 
is unnecessary since it is possible to isolate the various groups 
of scientists without recourse to shared paradigms. Thus this use 
of ’paradigm1 can be eliminated fairly easily.
This leaves us with two other uses, which Masterman calls the ’meta­
physical paradigm* and the ’artefact or construct paradigm’. Having 
isolated a group of scientists we can ask what it is that they share, 
and the answer Kuhn gives in the body of the text is ’a paradigm’, 
where this is taken to mean a body of beliefs and commitments, or 
more generally, a world-view. In the postscript, Kuhn acknowledges 
that the use of the term ’paradigm’ is inappropriate here, and sug­
gests the term ’disciplinary matrix’. The main sorts of components 
in such amatrix are, Kuhn suggests, common symbolisms, commitment 
to beliefs in particular models, and values. There is also another 
element, which is a commitment to the problem-solutions that serve
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as shared examples, and for which the term ’paradigm1 was originally 
introduced. Thus Kuhn comments that:
”..o c in much of the book the term ’paradigm’ is 
used in two different senses. On the one hand, it 
stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques, and so on shared by the members 
of a given community. On the other, it denotes one 
sort of element in that constellation, the concrete 
puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or 
examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for 
the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal 
science.”
(Kuhn 1970, p. 175)
The term ^paradigm’ is appropriate for these puzzle-solutions, since 
they serve as a pattern, or paradigm in the normal sense of the word, 
for further research.
1.2 The nature of learning for science
It appears to be commonly accepted that a science student speeds* ™o±<- //>k£ 
engaged in ’cognitive’ rather than ’affective’ learning. According 
to Bloom et al, the term ’cognitive’ covers ’’activities such as 
remembering and recalling knowledge, thinking, problem solving, 
creating” (Bloom 1956 p.2), and these activities are distinct from 
such things as ’’interests, attitudes and values, and the develop­
ment of appreciations" (p.7) which are covered by the term ’affective*. 
Pring suggests that this distinction "rests upon the belief that 
the cognitive capacities - the ability to know and to think and to 
understand - can be conceptually isolated from the feeling side of 
mental life and analysed without reference to it" (Pring 1971, p.85/6, 
original italics). He continues as follows:
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"It does not make sense to have knowledge as 
one’s objective..without caring about those 
standards of truth and correctness which are 
built into what it means to know and to under­
stand. and appreciate. To think scientifically 
entails a concern - a feeling, if you like - 
for the standards of scientific truth."
(Pring 1971, p.86)
This criticism is accepted by the authors of Volume 2 of the Handbook, 
on the Affective Domain, who point out that the division into cog­
nitive and affective is an arbitrary one, that reflects the way in 
which educators have traditionally classified objectives, rather 
than a basic distinction between behaviours. (See Krathwohl, Bloom 
and Masia 1964, p.47)
A similar point can be made, based on the arguments so far developed 
in this chapter. Kuhn suggests that part of a student's learning 
involves coming to share the same disciplinary matrix as shared by 
practitioners in the field; that is, the student becomes committed, 
not only to the same symbolic generalisations and theories, but also 
to the same beliefs in certain types of models and explanations, 
and to the same sets of values. If we ask how the student comes 
to share this disciplinary matrix, the answer Kuhn gives is that 
he does so by studying the paradigm, that is, by studying the con­
crete puzzle-solutions that are found in text books, by applying 
theories to problems, by doing examples and gaining practice in the 
laboratory. Thus, it is through what might be thought of as cog­
nitive learning that the student also learns things that might be 
thought of as coming under the heading of affective. Moreover, as 
Pring suggested, this affective learning is not just something which 
happens to accompany cognitive learning, it is an essential part of it.
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If the supposedly cognitive learning of scientific concepts did 
not also involve an affective part, normal science would not be 
possible since, normal science requires, as Kuhn suggests, a commit­
ment to a paradigm. That this commitment exists is shown by the 
incommensurability between paradigms.. In choosing between two rival 
paradigms, Kuhn insists that "each party must try, by persuasion, 
to convert the other." (Kuhn 1970, p.198) Therefore, Kuhn suggests 
that, to:
"....understand why science develops as it does.... 
one must understand....the manner in which a particular 
set of shared values interacts with the particular 
experiences shared by a community of specialists to 
ensure that most members of the group will ultimately 
find one set of arguments rather than another decisive."
(Kuhn 1970, p.200)
In criticising the use of the terms ’cognitive' and ’affective’,
I am not suggesting that we should simply be more precise in the 
way we apply these labels, nor that we must alter the way in which 
we apply them, but that learning is far.more complex than is implied 
_by_the_use_of__these labels. Thus, although it may be possible in 
theory to separate the learning of scientific concepts and theories, 
which might be thought to be cognitive learning, from the learning 
of beliefs and values, which is thought of as affective, we must not 
think that there is a corresponding distinction in practice, nor 
that the cognitive and the affective are two components of learning. 
Kuhn points out that it is often thought that "scientific knowledge 
is embedded in theory and rules; (and that) problems are supplied 
to gain facility in their application". However, he continues by 
saying:
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"I have tried to argue.....that this localisation 
of the cognitive content of science is wrong. After 
the student has done many problems, he may gain only 
added facility by solving more. But at the start 
and for some time after, doing problems is learning 
consequential things about nature."
(Kuhn 1970, p.188/9)
It is also, I suggest, learning consequential things about how scientists 
view nature. Therefore, at the start, doing problems may well involve 
learning that might be classed as affective as well as learning 
classed as cognitive. This implies that it is not simply what the 
student is doing that determines whether learning is cognitive or 
affective, but also the extent to which the student already shares 
the disciplinary matrix that forms the context for the paradigm.
Thus, it seems to me that not only is the division of learning into 
cognitive or affective domains based on a naive theory of knowledge, 
but it also has various attendant dangers. Although the distinction 
may be a convenient one, traditionally made by educators, and al­
though in some instances learning may well consist of a purely cog­
nitive component, problems are likely to arise due to the fact that 
the classification of learning into cognitive and affective is normally 
done by a member of the community, sharing the particular disciplinary 
matrix. Such a person, while able to identify cognitive learning, 
will probably be unaware of the affective learning that exists for 
the student who does not yet share the same values. Thus, there is 
a tendency to perceive the difficulties experienced by weaker students 
as being less than they are.
It is reasonable to suggest that for any piece of learning that a 
subject-expert classifies as ’cognitive1, the degree of affective
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learning also involved will differ from student to student, and 
this will not.depend simply on their previous immediate learning 
experiences, but on, what we might call, the character and attitudes 
of the students themselves. Once we recognise that so-called cog­
nitive learning is inextricably connected with affective learning, 
we can begin to see attitude problems in a different and, I suggest, 
more useful way. Instead of trying to measure likes and dislikes, 
which can reflect so many different factors, we become more concerned 
with the extent to which a student is able to share various commit­
ments and values. It is clear that if affective learning ’contam­
inates’ the cognitive learning of a science for some students, this 
’contamination’ is likely to be considerably increased for the 
majority of science students studying mathematics.
The values expected by the mathematics teacher, concerning such things 
as accuracy, consistency, simplicity, elegance, clarity, degree of 
generality, etc., will be different from those values that the science 
student is in the process of acquiring from the study of the paradigms 
in his science subjects. We can illustrate the different values that 
will be expected by the mathematician and the scientist, by consider­
ing one of these: generality. If we consider the solution of a second 
order differential equation, then the mathematician will be interested 
in the general result that there will be two arbitrary constants.
The scientist, on the other hand, will be more interested in how to 
find these constants in particular situations, and thus, in a sense 
he is; interested in a more specific result than the mathematician. 
However, the scientist is also interested in the fact that a second 
order differential equation has general application to a variety of
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different sorts of physical phenomena, Thus, on the one hand, the 
mathematics teacher will expect, what might be termed 'mathematical' 
generality, and on the other hand, the science teacher will expect, 
what might be called, physical generality.
1,3 Learning of Mathematics for Science
Now consider the following quotation, bearing in mind that we are 
not concerned with learning scientific concepts, but with mathematical 
concepts that occur in science:
"Scientists. never learn concepts, laws and theories
in the abstract and by themselves. Instead, these 
intellectual tools are from the start encountered in 
a historically and pedagogically prior unit that 
displays them with and through their applications....
(which) accompany the theory into the textbooks 
from which the future practitioner will learn his
trade.  The process of learning a theory depends
upon the study of applications, including practice 
problem-solving both with a pencil and paper and with 
instruments in the laboratory."
(Kuhn 1970, p.46/7)
The implications that we can draw from this are that the problems 
that science students encounter with mathematics are, in part due 
to the fact that mathematical concepts and theories are learnt "in 
the abstract and by themselves". It is only later that they are 
fitted into a paradigm that shows their application. However, we 
cannot, I feel,simply suggest that the mathematics should there-' 
fore be taught within and as a part of the science course. Apart 
from leading to a phrase book approach to language learning, such 
a suggestion also ignores an important role that mathematics may
-29-
play in science learning. Where mathematics is used as a language, 
one of its functions is a descriptive one. Mathematics is not simply 
an abstraction from various physical situations, it is also a language 
that describes those situations. For the student, such a language, 
if he can use it competently, may serve to demonstrate important 
similarities between apparently different phenomena. If the student 
simply used mathematics as a tool, then he could be provided with 
a pocket calculator. The fact that this would not be an adequate 
substitute for mathematics learning, points to the role that mathe­
matics also plays as a language.
2 ' j r ‘t*  ■ '
For example, electrical vibration is given by the formula E=Eq sin-^r- ,
2Tft
mechanical vibration by x=xq sin-^r- * and air pressure (sound) vibrations 
2 TT t
by P=P0 sm-y- . One way of expressing this is to say that a formula
2 Tit
of the general form y=yQ sin-^— represents a vibration. However this
’ e -
ignorjs the fact that it is not self-evident that an electrical field 
is in any way similar to a rigid piece of material or a volume of air. 
Consequently, it is not at all obvious that there can be a phenomenon, 
such as an ’oscillation', which is common to each, nor that these 
oscillations can be described by the same mathematical formula, or 
the same type of mathematical formula. To learn this is, therefore, 
to learn something significant about the phenomena being studied.
Thus it does not do justice to the use of mathematics as a language 
to say that formula X is an abstraction from the physical situations 
A, B, C,,.... If we were to view the subject from the student's 
point of view, we might find that initially he sees the formula 
as modelling A, X_ as modelling B, etc., and that only later does
D
he see that X., XD, Xr,.... are all forms of X. Once he sees the 
mathematical similarity between X^, X^, etc., this will help him to
see the physical similarities, between situations A, B, C, etc.
Now, in the above example, the similarity between the three forms of
2 7ft
the formula y=yQ sin-^r- is very obvious, but this need not always
be the case, e.g. Heisenberg’s and Schrodinger!s formulation of
d2s ■quantum mechanics. Nor is it obvious that the formulae mg =
d2Q
and mg sin0 = -ml^p- are both forms of the formula f = ma. However, 
without being aware of this similarity the student will not fully 
appreciate the similarities between free-fall and the motion of a 
pendulum. Further, it is through recognising the appropriate formula 
as versions of the formula f = ma, that a student is able to develop 
his concepts of ’force’, 'mass’ and ’acceleration’. (For a similar 
point see Kuhn 1970, p.188/9) Thus unless the mathematical similarity 
between the formulae is understood, the student will not fully under­
stand the meaning of these formulae nor will he appreciate their 
descriptive role.
Before concluding this chapter, it should be noted that Kuhn continues
the passage quoted at the beginning of this section as follows:
”If, for example, the student of Newtonian dynamics 
ever discovers the meaning of terms like ’force’,
'mass’, 'space1 and ’time’, he does so less from 
the incomplete though sometimes helpful definitions 
in his text than by observing and participating in 
the application of these concepts to problem-solution.”
(Kuhn 1970, p.47) 
While agreeing with what I think Kuhn is saying, I must disagree 
with a possible implication, which Kuhn may or may not have intended. 
What this passage seems to imply is that a concept may be defined and 
then applied, and that it is this application of a concept that gives 
the terms their meaning. However, I think it makes more sense (and 
this will I hope be brought out more clearly in the following chapter),
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and does not significantly alter Kuhn’s account, to suggest that 
the student learns the concepts ’force’, ’mass’, etc., (that is, as 
Kuhn says, the meaning of these terms) through the applications of 
these terms to problem-solution.
Thus, I am suggesting that although scientific terms are carefully 
defined, a definition, such as, for example, that ’force is the 
external agency which is capable of imparting motion to a body’, 
is totally inadequate at conveying the concept. A concept cannot 
be given by a definition, for even when the student has learnt the
definition, he will not be able to apply it. He can only learn the
concept by learning the use ’of the terms of science. This use, as
Kuhn implies, is learnt through examples and practice. We shall
see later that this must significantly alter our ideas about the 
transference of learning from mathematics to science.
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THE SYSTEMS APPROACH
2.1 Introduction
Over the past decade or so a more systematic approach to education 
has developed within the new discipline of educational technology. -
Davies (Davies 1971) distinguishes two separate sources of educational 
technology, which he feels should be brought together to produce a 
'systems approach* to education. I am not here concerned with what 
he calls educational technology 1, which is based on the use of
hardware such as tapes, T.V., etc. However, I shall be concerned
with what he calls educational technology 2, which involves:
" the application of behavioural science to the
problems of learning and motivation..... This view 
of educational technology is closely associated 
with the modern principles of programmed learning, 
and is characterised by task analysis, writing 
precise objectives, selection of appropriate 
learning strategies, reinforcement of correct 
responses, and constant evaluation.*’
(Davies 1971, p.7) . ' :
Thus the basic approach to evaluation that Davies puts forward is a
system in which one formulates aims, derives precise objectives from 
these and then tests these objectives. Other evaluation strategies 
have been developed, for example, Eraut points out the need to assess 
whether course aims are worthwhile and to take into account such 
things as practicality, cost, etc. when evaluating a course; (Eraut 1973) 
Pariett and Hamilton, suggest the importance of an anthropological 
approach, which they call' ’illuminative evaluation* (Pariett and 
Hamilton, 1972). These alternatives stress the.fact that a course 
is more than just its aims and objectives, and that when evaluating
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a course one must consider all the factors that interact to produce 
a particular teaching and learning situation,"'.However., in this 
thesis, I am not concerned with the evaluation of particular courses, 
where one has to consider all relevant factors, but with the general 
problems associated vvith teaching mathematics to science students.
Therefore I wish to considerwhether this general problem can be 
tackled by the sort of process Davies suggests, even though it may 
be argued that in particular circumstances there may be other factors 
that are important.
As we shall see, it is a basic directive of this evaluation strategy 
that the intended outcomes must be stated in a behavioural form in 
order to evaluate the observed outcomes of a course. A distinction 
is normally made between an educational aim, which,, according to 
Goodlad CGoodlad 1966, see Popham et al. 1969, p.35) is a "remote 
end for the guidance of educational activity" and an educational 
objective, which is a "statement of what students ought to know, 
be able to do, prefer or believe as a consequence of instruction". 
Therefore, the first question I would like to consider is, why it 
is thought necessary or desirable to specify precise descriptions 
of behaviour to replace more vague educational aims.
I think that two reasons can be given for this, and these both involve 
a criticism of the use of words such as 'understanding', 'appreciate1, 
etc. The first criticism is that words such' as 'understand', 'appreciate', 
•enjoy' have vague meanings in everyday speech, so that aims expressed 
in terms of these words do not convey very clearly what it is one 
wants the course to achieye. If educational technology is to be at
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all 'scientific' in its approach to educational problems, then it 
must carefully define and restrict the meanings of the words that it 
uses. Unless the meaning of words such as 'understanding' are clearly 
defined, it will be impossible for those involved in education to 
communicate unambiguously with each other.
The second reason for formulating precise behavioural objectives is 
based on a more fundamental criticism of the use of words such as 
'understanding'. In order to appreciate this criticism we must look 
at the history of Behaviourism, which, in reacting against a psychology 
based on introspection, committed itself to dealing entirely with 
observables and hence aligned itself with the philosophy of logical 
positivism, later to be known as logical empiricism. As Sockett 
writes:.
"The 'behavioural objectives' model of curriculum 
planning rests on a methodological behaviourism 
with connections to both operational definitions 
and a verification theory of meaning."
(Sockett 1973, p.38)
If this is so then it cannot be claimed that the systems approach 
to educational problems, adopted by educational technologists, is 
simply a naive empirical approach that requires no empirical justif­
ication. As soon as it is recognised that the methods of educational 
technology are based on certain philosophical assumptions, then it 
must also be accepted that a philosophical criticism, as well as 
criticism at a more practical level, is valid. This is particularly 
so under circumstances where either the underlying philosophy itself 
has been severely criticised, or where methods based on this philo­
sophy appear in principle, as well as in practice, to have little 
chance of success. I hope to show in this chapter that both these 
conditions apply. The philosophical arguments that I shall put
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forward to criticise the methods of educational technology will 
rely on the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, in which he is critical 
of his earlier contributions (albeit unintentional] to logical 
positivism.
2.2 Logical empiricism
The fundamental tenet of any form of empiricism is that knowledge 
is based on experience of the world and does not exist prior to 
experience. To this logical empiricism added the necessity for a 
logical analysis of the language in which the knowledge, was expressed. 
It is possible, suggested the logical empiricists, for sentences 
to appear to be statements of knowledge when they are not. Such 
sentences include all or most of those of meta-physics and religion. 
Sentences ^ v formally true (such as those of mathematics,
which according to Russell, and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, 
could be reduced to tautologies), nor were capable of verification 
or falsification by experience, were thought to be meaningless.
Thus, in order to distinguish what they thought to be sense from 
what they thought to be non-sense, the logical empiricists proposed 
the following criterion of meaning: any meaningful statement^should 
either be capable, at least in principle, of being tested experi­
mentally, or should be capable of being translated into statements 
which are themselves capable, at least in principle, of being tested 
experimentally. As an example, Schlick says that the proposition 
’there is a mountain of height 3000 m on the other side of the moon1 
makes sense since it is capable of being shown to be either true 
or false (although at the time he said this there was no technical 
means available for testing the proposition). (Schlick 1959) Thus
■ r'
-36-
all sentences are true, false or meaningless.
The legitimate method of analysis of sentences is by means of the 
prepositional logic developed by frege and Russell. Thus language 
was seen as approximating, to a greater or lesser extent, according 
to how 'scientific’ it was, to a sort of calculus governed by precise 
rules. This enabled the logical empiricists to suggest that, although 
a sentence may not itself be directly, testable, and clearly many 
sentences of science were not, it should nonetheless be built up 
from sentences which, were testable. Thus according to Ayer:
"The underlying assumption is that there are 
statements which are elementary in the sense 
that, if they are true, they correspond to 
absolutely simple facts.”
(Ayer 1959, p.11)
Even though we may never use such elementary statements in the ordinary 
course of language use, the statements we do use ’’are significant 
only in so far as they say what would be said by affirming certain 
elementary statements and denying certain others, that is, only in 
so far as they give a true or false picture of the ultimate ’atomic’ 
facts” (Ayer 1959, p.11). Therefore, in order to determine the 
truth or falsity of a meaningful complex sentence, one first ascertains 
the truth or falsity of the consituent atomic sentences and then 
ascertains the truth or falsity of the complex sentences by means of 
an appropriate truth-table into which the truth values of the atomic 
sentences have been inserted.
These elementary sentences corresponding to atomic facts, were assumed, 
to be reports of single observations. According to Hempel, an 
observation sentence is "any sentence which- correctly or incorrectly - 
asserts of one or more specifically named objects that they have, 
or that they lack, some specified observable characteristic.” (Hempel
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1959, p.110) Thus w.e can express the criterion for a sentence to be 
meaningful in terms of observation sentences by saying that a meaning­
ful sentence is either an observation sentence or can be translated 
into an observation sentence. All sentences of science were thought 
to be ultimately reducible to observation sentences; the sentences 
as they stand are merely shorthand forms of this set of observation 
sentences. Similarly Carnap argues that "every sentence of psychology 
may be formulated in physical language", that is, "all sentences 
of psychology describe physical occurrences, namely, the physical 
behaviour of humans and other animals", and so physical language is 
"a language into which every sentence may be translated". (Carnap 
1959, p.165)
The proper method of science was thought to be a process of induction 
starting from single observations and gradually building up more 
general statements. In order to show how this ideal picture of 
scientific progress could be reconciled to the actual practice of 
science, Carnap introduced the idea of an "abbreviated method" which 
is possible when the scientist is in possession of universal sen­
tences. Thus, "it sometimes seems to be the case that a general 
law is established on the basis of some single event. For instance, 
if a physicist can determine a certain physical constant, say, the 
heat of conductivity of a sample of some pure metal, in a single 
experiment, he will be convinced that, on other occasions, not only 
the sample examined but any similar sample of the same substance will’, 
very probably be characterisable by the same constant."(Carnap 
1959, p.169) This generalisation from a single event is only pos­
sible because, uas a result of many previous observations the physicist 
is in possession of a universal sentence of a higher order", (p.169)
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The universal sentence which allows him to take this short-cut can 
be roughly stated; "All (or: the following) physical constants of 
metals vary only slightly in time and from sample to sample." (p.169) 
This process of induction as the correct method of science applies 
not only to the physical sciences but also to the human sciences.
Thus psychology should start from reports of simple facts and only 
later arrive at more general statements. Since man is an animal 
it is not only legitimate but also proper to investigate animal 
behaviour as a prelude to investigating man’s behaviour, since animal 
behaviour is simpler. True statements about human behaviour can then 
be obtained by induction from statements about animal behaviour.
2.3 Logical empiricism in science
Logical empiricism as a basis of science has been criticised by 
many philosophers of science, from Popper onwards. As Ayer points 
out, there is a serious difficulty in the case of such universal 
statements as the one given above by Carnap.
"For while the truth of such a statement may be 
confirmed by the accumulation of favourable instances, 
it is not formally entailed by them; the possibility 
that a further instance will refute it must always 
remain open: and this means that statements of this 
sort are not conclusively verifiable. On the other 
hand, they are conclusively falsified in the sense 
that a negative instance formally contradicts them."
(Ayer 1959, p.13)
This problem of induction, which has been recognised since Hume, 
was not solved by the logical empiricists. Russell, who was closely 
associated with the Vienna circle of philosophers who originated 
logical positivism, suggested that the principle of induction should
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be accepted as a fundamental logical principle, for "without this 
principle science is impossible". (Russell 1961, p.647)
According to Magee, "Popper's seminal achievement has been to offer 
an acceptable solution to the problem of induction. In doing this 
he has rejected the whole orthodox view of scientific method.....and 
replaced it with another". (Magee 1973, p.22) Popper recognised 
the logical asymmetry' between verification and falsification, and 
incorporated it by suggesting it is the possibility of falsification 
that distinguishes a science from non-science. Thus, scientific 
knowledge is based on experience, but in the sense that theories 
are falsifiable and not verifiable by experience; scientific theories 
can be, and should be tested by systematic attempts to refute them. 
Although new theories may be arrived at by a process of induction, 
this is not relevant to whether or not they &/»£. ’scientific1; theories 
are only scientific by virtue of being testable. As Magee points 
out, Popper was not, like the logical empiricists, interested in 
distinguishing sense from non-sense, but science from non-science. 
Thus Popper accepts neither that induction is the fundamental method 
of science, nor that statements which are not testable by experience 
are meaningless. Statements which are not testable are not state­
ments of science, but they may well be meaningful.
Magee suggests that Popper also criticises the logical empiricists 
for their suggestion that it is possible to start simply from obser­
vation, and from these pure observations arrive at more general
statements or theories. For Popper, " the belief that we Can
start with pure observations alone, without anything in the nature 
of a theory, is absurd". (Quoted from Conjectures and Refutations,
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Popper 1963, p.46, by Magee 1973, p.33) This means, as Popper wrote 
earlier "...that observations, and even more so observation state-• 
ments and statements of experimental results, are always interpretations 
of the facts observed; they are interpretations in the light of 
theories." (Quoted from the Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper,
1959, p.107, by Magee 1973, pp.33, 34)
As we have seen, Kuhn, like Popper, rejects that picture, implied 
by logical empiricism, of science approaching absolute truth. The 
revolutions which overthrow existing paradigms, and establish new 
ones, necessitate the re-evaluation of prior facts. Thus sentences 
of science are only meaningful assertions within particular paradigms, 
and are not universally meaningful simply by appeal to experience.
(see Kuhn 1970)
• Toulmin also rejects the arguments put forward by the logical 
empiricists and claims that their views are too limiting since they 
reduce the ways in which knowledge can be tested by experience to 
one sort only: that of matching particular propositions against 
empirical facts. Toulmin points out that science does.not consist 
of just individual propositions, but also concepts and theories, 
and there can be no question of matching concepts against facts, 
nor of choosing a new theoretical structure just by seeing how it 
matches with particular facts. However, this does not imply that 
conceptual problems are not also empirical, nor that scientific 
theories are chosen on the personal whims of scientists. Concepts 
and theories are subjected to objective external constraints by 
being required to produce hypotheses which can be tested, (see 
Toulmin 1972)
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Ziman has suggested that the attempt to arrive at general principles 
of induction for science has not succeeded. It is often the case 
that complex theories, such as in elementary particle physics, depend 
on very few observations. He suggests that the distinctive feature 
of science is that it is "Public Knowledge”:
"Its facts and theories must survive a period of 
critical study and testing by other competent 
and disinterested individuals, and must be found 
so persuasive that they are almost universally 
accepted. The objective of Science is not just 
to acquire information nor to utter all non­
contradictory notions; its goal is a consensus 
of rational opinion over the widest possible 
field."
(Ziman 1968, p.9)
Thus science is empirical not because it produces logical inferences, 
by means of we 11-defined inductive processes from observation state­
ments, but because it is subjected to an ongoing process of experi­
ential testing. The ways in which experience is brought to bear 
are varied and do not just consist of matching statements with obser­
vation. Ravetz makes a similar point when he says that the success 
of science is not due to any magic formula, but rather "the scientific 
knowledge we possess is the result of a social endeavour, which over 
the centuries has developed an approach appropriate to its limited 
goals ". (Ravetz 1973, p.181)
I think it is fair to conclude that the consensus of opinion among 
philosophers is that logical empiricism has not provided a suitable 
philosophy of the natural sciences. The important area of debate now 
centres around the different theories put forward by Kuhn and Popper 
(see Lakatos and Musgrave 1970). This, however, is not the case 
in the behavioural sciences,
2.4 Empiricism in the Behavioural Sciences
In order to appreciate the influence that logical empiricism has :
had in psychology it is necessary to look at the development of the 
behavioural sciences, and the philosophical framework that was re­
placed. When Watson introduced Behaviourism in psychology between 
1910 and 1920, he deposed the Structural Psychology expounded by 
Wundt. Mischel has suggested (Mischel 1969) that Wundt’s New 
Psychology embraced the Cartesian philosophy of Mind/Body dualism, 
and so mental and physical processes were seen as running parallel, 
to one another. Since the mind was private, the most important 
technique of this psychology was introspection. Watson’s Behaviour­
ism (and the Neobehaviourism of Hull and Tolmin that succeeded it) 
was a reaction against the concern with ’unobservables’ such as a 
mental ’inner record’. If the mind was private, and not susceptible 
to observation, then psychology should have nothing to do with it, 
but should concern itself only with observables. Consequently intro­
spection and all reference to mental states were rejected in favour 
of the Stimulus-Response approach.
From Watson’s classical Behaviourism emerged Neobehaviourism, in which 
some of the inadequacies of Behavioursim were removed. For example, 
'intervening variables' were introduced between Stimulus and Response. 
According to Weimer and Palermo (Weimer and Palermo 1973, p.225), 
Neobehaviourism may be said to date from Hull's introduction of 
Mediation Theory in 1933. They go on to suggest that there are 
several distinctive features of Neobehaviourism, and amorg these are 
certain ’metaphysical directives',
"These directives were largely constituted by an 
explicit philosophy of science and/or methodology 
of research, and by the implicit effects and pre­
suppositions of that philosophy-methodology con­
cerning the 'scientific' nature of psychology."
(Weimer and Palermo 1973, p.225) 
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The following directives, taken from their list, are I feel, relevant 
to our particular inquiry:
"(2) The explicit philosophy is empiricism (in ’modern’
dress: logical positivism, and later, logical empiricism...)
(3) But observation must be objective. Only the objectively 
observable is scientific. As Tolman put it in des­
cribing his own behaviourist position:....’an organism’s 
private mind, if he have any, can never be got at’.
(5) Since there is a legitimate scientific method (the 
sophisticated inductivism of logical empiricism), which 
specifies that science collects facts and then induces 
theoretical generalisations from them, the ’science’
of psychology must study simple phenomena exhaustively 
and then (and only then) tackle the more complex 
phenomena. Psychology should be a building block 
endeavour that moves from simple-to-complex phenomena. 
Psychological atomism is the result. v
(6) A resultant atomistic directive states that the complexity 
of the ’higher’ forms of behaviour is one of degree only....
(8) Behaviour is to be understood as a function of the
interaction of variables intervening between objective 
stimuli in the environment. The laws of behaviour are 
laws showing the relationships between variations in 
stimulus input and response output.
(10) The study of all behaviour of all organisms is equally 
legitimate, and the use of animals and non-adults as 
subjects is legitimated. Further, due to the belief in 
directives (5) and (6), in combination with the tacit 
assumption that animal behaviour is ’simple' in com­
parison to human behaviour, the exhaustive study of 
’simple’ behaviours in ’lower’ animals is to be preferred.”
(Weimer and Palermo 1973 pp.225-7) 
It is useful to see how these directives are applied in practice, 
and this can be done by considering the ’systems approach’ in more 
detail. Some limitations of this approach, embodying the above 
directives, can be shown up by seeing how it might be used to solve 
some of the problems associated with teaching mathematics to science 
students.
The first stage in the systems approach is to formulate a list of 
aims or general, long-term intentions. The next stage, which is
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crucial, is to translate these vague aims into specific objectives 
that communicate a detailed account of the intended behavioural out­
comes of the course. There are several reasons for obtaining behavioural 
objectives from aims, and Mager suggests the following advantages:
"When clearly defined goals are lacking, it is 
impossible to evaluate a course or programme 
efficiently, and there is no sound basis for 
selecting appropriate materials, content, or 
instructional methods.”
Second, objectives enable a clear assessment of:
"....the degree to which the learner is able to 
perform in the manner desired.....unless goals 
are clearly and firmly fixed.....tests are at 
best misleading; at worst, they are irrelevant, 
unfair, or useless.”
Third:
"....the student is provided the means to evaluate 
his own progress at any place along the route of 
instruction and is able to organise his efforts 
into relevant activities."
(Mager 1962, pp.3-4)
Once objectives, defining the terminal behaviour that is intended,, 
have been prepared, these can be used to devise tests to measure 
the extent to which the objectives have been achieved. The deriv­
ation of tests from objectives should be straightforward, since 
the test questions are designed to elicit the behaviour specified 
by the objectives. Although in practice students are normally tested 
on completion of a course, in some situations, for example where 
students1 backgrounds are unknown, it may be preferable to also give 
pre-tests before the course. The use of both pre- and post-tests 
enable direct comparisons to be made, and also ensure that students 
who can pass the pre-test do not take the course. The post-test 
is derived directly from the course objectives, therefore, provided 
the course objectives are complete and accurate descriptions of the
-45-
intended outcomes, post-test scores should provide criteria for 
evaluation of the course. This evaluation can then provide the basis 
for future improvements and innovations. By looking at those objectives 
that are poorly achieved and isolating the appropriate parts of the 
course aimed at achieving these objectives, the teacher is able to 
discover those parts of the course that need improving. Subsequent 
post-test scores monitor the extent to which the course has been 
improved. Thus there may be considerable advantages in adopting 
the systems approach, both in helping the teacher clarify for him­
self what he is trying to teach and in evaluating how successful 
he has been.
It is generally recognised that the statement of precise objectives 
is difficult within the higher education sector, and that educators 
still lack sufficient expertise. Elton, for example, in the paper 
mentioned earlier,, suggests that the problems arising in the teaching 
of mathematics to science students should be tackled by first trans­
lating aims (and he gives some examples) into precise and detailed 
objectives. However, he then goes on to suggest that this is ’’not 
an easy task, but it is clear that it is most easily done for those 
parts of the course in which the tool aspects of mathematics is 
stressed. Even there it is rarely done and ordinary examinations 
are certainly inadequate for the purpose.’’ (Elton 1971) An implic­
ation of this might be that, although difficult to prepare objectives, 
it is nonetheless possible in principle, even where mathematics is 
used as a language in science.
As Elton suggests, it is easier to obtain objectives for those parts 
of a course in which the tool aspects of mathematics are stressed
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since it is possible to isolate the mathematical skills a student 
will require when the mathematics is used as a tool. Thus, the 
intended outcomes of the mathematics course can be specified in 
terms of the behaviour one wouId expect of a proficient tool-user. 
Where such behaviour can be identified, it is desirable to specify 
it as precisely as possible. For example, instead of expecting a 
student to ’be able to differentiate1, one would obtain a more 
precise description based on the sorts of functions the student has 
to differentiate in the science course. This would clearly be an 
improvement -on the use of ordinary examinations which, as Elton 
suggests, are inadequate, even where we are considering the tool 
aspects of mathematics for science. The ways in which they are 
inadequate are clear when we realise that a student is able to 
pass a course with a percentage mark of between 40' to 50, by answering 
perhaps eight out of twelve questions, which may well cover as little 
as half the total course. The purpose of ordinary examinations is, 
generally, to distinguish between students, rather than to simply 
ascertain the student’s total knowledge. However, this means that 
a student can pass a mathematics for science course, knowing a very 
small fraction of what has been taught, yet he is expected to be 
able to use all the mathematics in the science course. In a situation 
in which the outcomes of one course are pre-requisits for another 
course, a criterion-referenced test, rather than the. usual norm- 
referenced test, would be more suitable. Therefore, in those situ­
ations in which it is possible to formulate the behavioural out­
comes of a mathematics for science course, it is reasonable to expect 
a high level of mastery of the objectives.
Thus we can see that where it is possible to specify the intended 
outcomes of a mathematics for science course in terms of student
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behaviour, it is possible to use the systems approach to solve some 
of the associated problems. I have suggested that this is possible 
where mathematics is used as a tool in science, since specific 
behaviours can be isolated.
2.5 Limitations of the use of objectives
Before we consider the serious limitations of the systems approach, 
it must be recognised that Mager undoubtedly represents an extreme 
position, implying, as he does, that education can be described in 
the same terms as are used to describe training or instruction. 
Therefore, in criticising Mager, later in the chapter, I do not 
consider that I am criticising a view that is commonly held, since
I am sure that the majority of those involved in education would not 
agree with all that Mager says. Nonetheless, I think that less 
committed forms of Mager's position are commonly held and these 
positions are still based on many of the underlying assumptions 
about the nature of learning and understanding that underpin Mager's 
position. Thus I consider that it is necessary to criticise this 
extreme so as to establish the limitations that must be imposed on 
the use of objectives. Clear statements of the stance that I am 
criticising are given in the following quotations from Mager:
"Though it is all right to include such words as 
'understand' and 'appreciate' in a statement of an 
objective, the statement is not explicit enough to 
be useful until it indicates how you intend to 
sample the 'understanding' and Appreciating'.
Until you describe what the learner will be 
DOING when demonstrating that he 'understands* 
or 'appreciates', you have described very little 
at all."
(Mager 1962, p.11)
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and Sullivan:
"Some verbs that may be employed in writing 
objectives for specific subject-matter areas 
have meanings that are so precise that they 
require no further explication. Such words, as 
spell, subtract, read and alphabetize should 
be used in preparing statements of objectives 
whenever they are appropriate. The above list 
(which gives six performance terms, viz Identify,
Name, Describe, Construct, Order, Demonstrate, 
a definition for each and examples of objectives*) 
however, names and defines behaviours common to 
many curriculum areas, and it provides a frame­
work for constructing precise objectives for 
most instructional tasks."-
*my own insertion (Sullivan 1969, p.78)
The suggestion that it is possible to replace all 'vague* words
by their precise equivalents is an assumption that Mager does not
question. It appears to be blind faith that leads Mager to dismiss
the use of the word 'appreciate' in the objective 'To develop an
appreciation of music', in the following way:
"Let's ask the key question of this objective. What 
is the learner DOING when he is demonstrating that 
he has achieved this objective? What is he doing 
when he is 'appreciating' music? You can surely 
see that, as now stated, the objective does not 
give the answer. Since the objective neither 
precludes nor defines any behaviour, it would 
be necessary to accept any of the following 
behaviour as evidence that the learner appreciates 
■ music:
1. The learner sighs in ecstasy when listening 
to Bach.
2. The learner buys a hi-fi system and $500 worth 
of records.
3. The learner correctly answers 95 multiple choice 
questions on the history of music.
4. The learner writes an eloquent essay on the 
meaning of 37 operas.
Si*-' The learner says, 'Oh, man, this is the most.
It's just too much.™
(Mager 1962, p.15)
One is inclined to take this example as a reductio ad absurdum of 
his approach in this and similar educational situations.
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This example shows up the major flaw in Mager's position. We can 
infer, from Hager's argument that he considers there is a 'something'' 
called 'appreciating music', that can be detected and measured. In 
the same way, he implies that there is something, called 'understanding' 
which can be detected. What I wish to criticise is this implication 
that all cases where we would say that someone appreciates, or all 
cases where we would say someone understands, have something in common, 
namely, something called 'appreciation', in the first case, and 
’understanding' in the second. For Mager, this something is, or is 
represented by, the person's behaviour.
However, my disagreement with Mager is not that I consider that what 
these different cases have in common is, for example, a particular 
mental state or feeling rather than particular behaviour, although 
this may well be the unstated objection of many to Mager's extreme 
behaviourism. Therefore, I wish to make it clear that my criticism 
of Mager does not consist in asserting that understanding is some­
thing that occurs in the student's mind and so cannot be described 
in terms of behaviour. This is the sort of objection that is put 
forward, for example, by Pring when he says:
"The more the description of objectives approximates 
to a description of overt behaviour, the greater 
the need to examine difficulties in translating 
propositions about the mind into those that des­
cribe what can be observed."
{Pring 1971, p.84)
Instead, I am putting forward an argument developed by Wittgenstein, 
based on the observation that the different situations in which we 
would say that someone has understood do not have some essence which 
is common.
I think that the unease that, for example, teachers feel when reading 
Mager, arises because he seems to reduce the value of education and 
suggests that teachers should be concerned only with what the students 
can do. Many teachers would say that there are some things that 
cannot be expressed in terms of student behaviour. For example,
Ryder (Ryder 1970) in an introduction to the use of behavioural 
objectives in physics teaching, quotes the objections of Atkins 
that by concentrating on behavioural objectives, other important 
outcomes that cannot be expressed in behavioural terms will tend 
to be ignored. I think that in reacting against Mager's reduction 
of a course to behavioural outcomes, there is a natural tendency to 
feel that the outcomes that are ignored are things that go on in the 
student's mind. Thus a modified form of Mager's position might hold 
that only some aims can be expressed in terms of behavioural objectives, 
but others are to do with things that go on inside the student and 
so cannot be measured. However, I am as critical of many aspects 
of this sort of position as I am of Mager's position, in as much 
as it implies that all situations in which we would say that under­
standing occurs are similar in that there is something, called 'under­
standing' that is present in the person's mind; that is, that when­
ever someone understands he has a mental state of understanding.
What I am suggesting is that understanding is not, nor is it represented 
by, either a particular sort of behaviour, or a particular mental 
state.
In order to substantiate what I have said, I wish to come back to 
the quotation in which Mager claims that a statement containing the 
word 'understand' is of little use unless it also states what the 
student should be doing. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein
draws our attention to the meaning of the word 'games1, and the 
following quotation is very relevant to our present discussion:
"Consider for example the proceedings that we call 
'games'. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games 
Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all?
- Don't say: 'There must be something common, or 
they would not be called 'games', but look and see 
whether there is anything common to all. - For if 
you look at them you will not see something that is 
common to all, but similarities, relationships, nnd 
a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't 
think, but look! - Look for example at board-games, 
with their multifarious relationships. Now pass 
to card-games, here you find many correspondences 
with the first group, but many common features drop 
out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball- 
game s , much that is common is retained, but much 
is lost. - Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess 
with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning 
and losing, or competition between players? Think 
of patience. In ball-games there is winning and 
losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall 
and catches it again, this feature has disappeared.
Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at 
the difference between skill in chess and skill in 
tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; 
here is the element of amusement, but how many other 
characteristic features have disappeared! And we can 
go through the many, many other groups of games in the 
same way; can see how similarities crop up and 
disappear.
"And the result of this examination is: we see a comp­
licated network of similarities overlapping and cross­
crossing: sometimes overall similarities sometimes 
similarities of detail.
"I can think of no better expression to characterise 
these similarities than 'family resemblances'; for 
the various resemblances between members of a family: 
build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, 
etc., etc., overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - 
And I shall say 'games' form a family."
(Wittgenstein 1953, 66,67) 
If we look we see that all games do not have something in common, 
yet even though there are no specific criteria for an activity to 
be a game, this does not mean that in any given context the word 
'game' is ambiguous and of little use. It is a fact of our language 
that in a given context the word 'game' has a clear meaning which 
does ‘not depend On precise behavioural criteria, and that, moreover
it is not possible to produce a behavioural definition of the word 
’game’. This does not mean, however, that we would accept an analogous 
argument to the one put forward by Mager, that a sentence containing
the word 'game’ conveys little unless one states what a person is
doing when he is playing a game; just because a game cannot be defined 
in terms of behaviour does not mean that, 'game' is a vague word.
Nor is it the case that we can make the word more precise by means 
of a definition:
"If someone were to draw a sharp boundary (for the
meaning of the word ’game1) I could not acknowledge
it as the one that I too always wanted to draw, or 
had drawn in my mind For I did not want to draw ^
one at all. His concept can then be said to be 
not the same as mine, but akin to it. This kinship 
is that of two pictures, one of which consists of 
colour patches with vague contours, and the other 
of patches similarly shaped and distributed, but 
with clear contours. The kinship is just as un­
deniable as the difference.
"And if we carry this comparison still further it is 
clear that the degree to which the sharp picture can 
resemble the blurred one depends on the latter’s 
degree of vagueness. : For imagine having to sketch a 
defined picture ’corresponding' to a blurred one.
In the latter there is a blurred red rectangle; for . \
it you put down a sharply defined one. Of course - 
several such sharply defined rectangles can be drawn 
to correspond to the indefinite one. - But if the 
colours in the original merge without a hint of any 
outline won’t it become a hopeless task to draw a 
sharp picture corresponding to the blurred one? Won’t 
you then have to say: 'Here I might just as well draw 
a circle or a heart as a rectangle, for all the colours 
merge.’ Anything - and nothing - is right?"
(Wittgenstein, 1953, 76,77)
Wittgenstein suggests that the word ’understanding’ is like this; 
the different situations 'in'which-we would use ’understanding’ do 
not have any single thing that is common, but instead there is a 
complicated network of inter-relations. If therefore, there is a 
family resemblance between’different situations in which we would 
say someone understands, rather than a common thread running through
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all situations, then we cannot specify particular behaviour corres­
ponding to, or representing, understanding. Thus to produce a set 
of objectives corresponding to an aim beginning ’the student should 
understand....’, is, to use Wittgenstein’s analogy, to try to produce 
a sharp picture that corresponds to a blurred one. The extent to 
which this can be done depends on how blurred the original picture 
is. Sometimes the sharper picture will be more useful than the 
blurred one, but at other times it is the indistinct picture that is 
needed. In the same way, the similarity between an educational aim 
and a behavioural objective will depend on the aim. In some cases 
the objective may be useful, in others the objective may be so remote 
from the aim as to be of no use at all. These points will, I hope, 
be made clearer in later chapters in which Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
is considered in more detail.
2.6 Implications for a technology of education
To conclude this chapter I would like to try to reassure an educational 
technologist who might feel that I am, as it were, cutting the ground 
from underneath his feet, by rejecting the scientific basis for a 
technology of education. To do this, I shall draw his attention to 
an argument put forward by Travers, that a technology need not be 
science based. Travers begins his argument by pointing out that:
’’The concept that a revolution could be brought about 
in education through the development of an educational 
technology appears to have originated in the writing 
of Pressey (1932) nearly fifty years ago.....The new 
technology of education was to be a science based 
technology and the scientific foundation was to be 
provided by the emerging behavioural sciences.”
(Travers 1973, pp.979/980)
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In fact this technology was not developed and. Skinner "took the 
position that a technology had not emerged, as Pressey had predicted 
it would, because the science of learning had not, until near mid­
century, provided the foundation on which a technology of education 
could be built.” (p.980) However, by the 1950’s, "Skinner believed 
that a science of learning had, at last, advanced to the point where 
it could be used as a guide in the development of a technology of 
education" (p.980).
This optimism was not justified, and:
’’Skinner's view that a body of psychological know­
ledge is there, awaiting application, is not shared 
by many other scientists who investigate learning 
phenomena."
(Travers 1973, p.980) 
Scientific theories of learning were based on controlled laboratory 
experiments and as Travers points out, translations from the lab­
oratory to the real situation have not been marked by a history of 
success. In fact, Travers criticises the view of technology that is 
implied:
"The basic idea propounded by both Pressey and Skinner 
was that technology was a result of scientific develop­
ment and that technology would not develop until the 
necessary underlying sciences had progressed to the 
point where related technologies could be based upon 
them- This is a modern, and parochial, view of 
technology, for the fact is that technology has had 
a history of development at least back to the time 
of cave men, and probably before.....although the 
development of scientific knowledge has had enormous 
impact on some aspects of technology in recent times, 
history shows that technology has had growth independent 
of scientific knowledge."
(Travers 1973, p.980)
Kuhn (Kuhn 1970) makes a similar point to Travers when he suggests 
that, far from being based on science, technologies of the past have 
often played an important part in the emergence of a science. (See
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pages 15 and 16) They have played this role by (1) providing the 
science with facts that would not have been discovered in a cas'jupl 
investigation, (2) presenting science with particular problems, thus 
stimulating research along specific lines, (3) testing scientific 
theories in ways.in which they probably would otherwise not have 
been tested. On the other hand, technologies have undoubtedly 
benefitted from advances made in science. Thus we can suggest that 
there can be a two-way relationship between science and technology, 
rather than a one-way exchange of findings from science to technology.
So far, educational technology has simply tried to apply the findings 
of the behavioural sciences without trying to influence them. Within 
certain areas this has proved successful, for example, programme 
learning has found a number of applications. However, this does not 
mean that as soon as a technology of education encounters serious 
difficulties it must await further developments within the science 
on which it is based. Such an approach denies a technology its 
traditional role of bringing about developments in science. Clearly 
it cannot be the aim of this thesis to fulfill this role since, 
although 1 have started from what might be thought of as technological 
problems, I have not attempted to arrive at technological solutions. 
However, my criticisms of attempts to find solutions within the frame­
work set by the behavioural sciences will serve, I hope, to free 
educational technology from their present all-pervasive influence.
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CONCEPTS IN SCIENCE AND MATHEMATICS
3.1 Wittgenstein*s analyses of concepts
In the Prologue I put forward the suggestion that instead of talking 
about transference of understanding from the mathematics to the 
science class, we might be able to reformulate this in terms of 
concepts, and that we could then talk of transferring concepts in 
the same way as we talk of transferring skills. Thus, problems 
arising through students failing to transfer mathematical concepts 
could be investigated in the same way as we investigate problems 
arising through a failure to transfer skills.
In this chapter I wish to show that such a hope is illusory and 
that a reformulation of the transference of understanding in terms 
of concepts is faced with exactly the same difficulties. The idea 
that acquiring a concept might be similar to acquiring a skill is 
based on a traditional notion of a concept which, I believe, 
Wittgenstein has demonstrated convincingly to be inappropriate.
This traditional idea, which arose in philosophy, has also been 
taken over by psychology, and can be found in various psychological 
dictionaries: according to the Dictionary of General Psychology, a 
concept is a "set of abstracted principles or properties” (Heidenreich 
1970). The Dictionary of Psychology puts it slightly differently 
and defines conception as a "process which is characterised by the 
thinking of qualifies, aspects, and relations of objects......of which
language is the great instrument, and the product the concept - 
normally represented by a word1* (Drever 1964). The learning of
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concepts is referred to as ’concept formation* and, according to 
the Dictionary of General Psychology, a concept is formed by "the 
observation of characteristics common to a set of objects or situations. 
The abstract idea is derived from the grouping of objects by their 
distinguishing characteristics, common property or common relation­
ship" (Heidenreich 1970).
This view of a concept as a class or an abstraction from a class, 
can, for example, be traced back to Kant, where, according to the 
Dictionary of Philosophy, a concept is "any generic or class term, 
exclusive of relational terms or categories" (Runes 1950), and 
presumably, back to Aristotle, who formed Categories by abstracting 
the Universal from the particular. The idea of a concept is closely 
tied up with the meaning of words. The traditional view in philo­
sophy is that a word acquires a meaning by referring to something.
In some cases this is a particular, in others it is a ’universal* 
or a concept. Thus psychology has taken over this idea, so that 
the learning of meaning is seen as concept formation. There is, 
therefore, according to this view, a specific process by which 
meanings of words are learnt, and this process of concept formation 
is one of abstraction from classes of objects or situations.
However, according to Wittgenstein, the "idea of a general concept 
being a common property of its particular instances connects up with 
other primitive, too simple, ideas of the structure of language." 
(Wittgenstein 1958, p.17) In order to appreciate Wittgenstein’s 
analysis of concepts, and later, of understanding, it is, I think, 
necessary to discuss Wittgenstein's style, and by this I do not 
mean simply his literary style, but his style of philosophising.
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Wittgenstein’s style is closely connected with his conception of 
philosophy itself, and it is only by appreciating this style that we 
shall avoid drawing false conclusions. The first thing to notice 
is the construction of the Investigations, which Wittgenstein draws 
our attention to in the preface. The book consists of "the precip­
itate of philosophical investigations” which are written down as 
remarks: "my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them 
on in any single direction against their natural inclination. - And 
this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investi­
gation. For this compels us to travel over a wide field of thought 
criss-cross in every direction. - The philosophical remarks in this 
book are, as it were, a number of sketches of landscapes which were 
made in the course of these long and involved journeyings.” 
(Wittgenstein 1953, p.vii)
Thus Wittgenstein does not give a systematic account, and to try to 
translate his remarks into a systematic account is to distort his 
philosophy. Binkley takes Wittgenstein’s claims seriously, and some 
of the implications of Wittgenstein’s style can be seen in Binkley’s 
discussion of the analogy Wittgenstein makes between a philosopher 
and a therapist. Wittgenstein suggests that a philosophical problem 
is like an illness; it is like a neurotic obsession with a particular 
picture, for which the cure is therapeutic treatment.
"Whether it be an epidemic or an isolated case, 
philosophic treatment is directed towards philo­
sophic disease: it is a corrective, and sometimes 
a preventative, measure."
(Binkley 1973, p.llSJ 
Wittgenstein is, therefore not interested in putting forward a theory, 
nor even in denying a theory, except where this is part of the treat­
ment. He does not propose a ’correct’ picture, but tries to show
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the inadequacies that are inherent in the picture that we have be­
come obsessed with.
Failure to appreciate the analogy of the philosopher as therapist 
can result in the corrective pictures being mistaken for pictures 
which are claimed to be correct. Wittgenstein’s sketches are simply 
descriptions, not explanations or theories, and it is, as Binkley 
comments, "from this point of view we need to look at Wittgenstein’s 
treatment of such topics as private language, essentialism, family 
resemblances, etc. - in short, all the sketches grouped under rubrics 
which have since become theories." Cp.171)
In section 2.5, I quoted Wittgenstein's famous passage on ’games’ 
in which he points out that all games do not have something which 
is common, instead there is "a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, 
sometimes similarities of detail." However, Wittgenstein is not 
saying this is what concepts are like, he is simply showing us that 
a picture of a concept as a common attribute is, at least in some 
cases, and perhaps in many cases, too limited. Similarly, when 
Wittgenstein says that: "the meaning of a word is its use in the
pCLtOz .
language." ($.43) it is often forgotten that this applies for "a 
large class of cases - though not for all’r, and that the purpose 
of this remark is to get us away from the idea that the meaning of 
a word is something (.for example, a class or abstraction) to which 
the word refers. Wittgenstein is not saying what a concept is, he 
is trying to show us that we have a too simple picture. It is no 
argument against Wittgenstein to say, for example, that we can learn 
concepts without being able to use words and that therefore a concept
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is not given by the use of a word; in fact this is a remark that
Wittgenstein himself might have made, to show that a concept is not
as simple as we think it might be.
It is for the same purpose that Wittgenstein draws our attention to
how a concept is taught. Thus, Wittgenstein asks:
"How should we explain to someone what a game is?
I imagine that we should describe games to him, 
and we might add: ’This and similar things are 
called "games"1
(Wittgenstein, 1953, para. 69)* 
In this way, Wittgenstein draws ouh attention to certain aspects of 
language which we are inclined to overlook. Wittgenstein also em­
ploys dialogue to further the argument, the purpose of which is to 
show up flaws in commonly accepted.views, for as Wittgenstein writes:
"My aim is: to teach you to pass from a piece of 
disguised nonsense to something that is patent 
nonsense."
(Wittgenstein, 1953, 119)
The suggestion that a concept is an abstract principle or property 
is disguised nonsense, which Wittgenstein uncovers by means of the 
following dialogue which starts with Wittgenstein saying how he
would explain the meaning of certain words:  I shall explain
these words to someone who, say, only speaks French by means of the 
corresponding French words. But if a person has not yet got the 
concepts, I shall teach him to use the words by means of examples 
and by practice. - And when I do this I do not communicate less to 
him than I know myself." (208) But if someone feels that a concept 
is an abstracted property, they are likely to be dissatisfied with 
this explanation, and to reply: "’But then doesn’t our understanding 
reach beyond all the examples?”’. To which Wittgenstein comments:
Reference numbers in Wittgenstein 1953 refer to paragraph numbers
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"A very queer expression, and a quite natural one!" (209) It is 
natural because we feel that there must be something more to under­
stand than just giving examples. We feel that there must be some 
essence underlying all these uses and so we might ask: "’But do you
really explain to the other person what you yourself understand?
Don’t you get him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples, 
- but he has to guess their drift, to guess your intention.’” To 
which the reply is: ’’Every explanation which I can give myself I 
give to him too. - 'He guesses what I intend' would mean: various 
interpretations of my explanation come to his mind, and he lights 
on one of them. So in this case he could ask; and I could and should 
answer him.” (210)
To show how relevant Wittgenstein's remarks are, we can usefully turn 
from philosophy to a psychological learning theory proposed by Brunner, 
Goodnow and Austin (1956), which is implicitly criticised by the above 
quotation. According to their theory, a concept is a categorisation 
that renders "discriminately different things equivalent” (p.1), and 
the process of concept attainment is the "process of finding predictive 
defining attributes that distinguish exemplars from non-exemplars 
of the class.” (p.22) They illustrate this process with an example 
that is to be taken as a paradigm of concept attainment. A foreigner 
is introduced, by a friend, to various people and is told whether 
or not these people are influential. On this basis of being given 
the exemplars and non-exemplars, the foreigner has to abstract the 
attributes of the class of influential people. Brunner et al then 
consider the various strategies that are possible and which of these 
optimise the process of concept attainment under different conditions.
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Although it may be interesting to study these different strategies,
we are entitled to ask why the foreigner could not have been given
a list of the attributes of influential people, rather than having 
to guess these attributes. For the above example to serve as a para­
digm of concept attainment, the only answer that can be given is 
that/although in this particular case the attributes could have 
been listed, this is not always so, but nonetheless the process of 
concept attainment is the same in both cases. Thus the implication 
is that if, for example, a person has to learn the concept 'blue1,
he will do this by seeing what is common to blue things and thus
what distinguishes these exemplars from non-exemplars; in the first 
case the attributes abstracted are, for example, ’rich1, 1landowner', 
etc,, and in the second the attribute is 'blueness'. However, by 
means of the following examples, Wittgenstein tries to show that the 
appeal to 'seeing what is in common' cannot be so straightforward:
"Suppose I show someone various multicoloured pictures, 
and say: 'The colour you see in all these is called 
"yellow ochre"’.....Then he can look at, and point to 
the common thing.
Compare 'with this a case in which I shew him figures
of different shapes all painted the same colour, and
say: 'What these have in common is called "yellow 
ochre"'. :
And compare this case: I shew him samples of different 
shades of blue and say: ’The colour that is common 
to all these is what I call "blue"’."
(Wittgenstein 1953, 72J 
Thus Wittgenstein suggests that the idea of learning, say, the con­
cept ’blue’ by seeing what blue things have in common misleads us
by implying that what happens is that we acquire a sample or picture 
in our mind. "So if I am shewn various different leaves and told 
’This is called a "leaf"', I get the idea of the shape of the leaf, 
a picture of it in my mind." (73) "But", Wittgenstein goes on to
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ask, "what does the picture of a leaf look like when it does not
shew us any particular shape, but ’what is common to all shapes of 
leaf’? Which shade is the ’sample in my mind’ of the colour green -
the sample of what is common to all shades of green?” W’ittgenstein
then goes on to suggest that even if there were such a sample of 
'pure green', we still must know how this sample is to be used, that 
is, that it is used as "a sample of all that is greenish and not as 
a sample of pure green”. (73)
So the point here is that even if, having learnt a concept, one holds 
a picture or abstraction in one’s mind, this alone would not be 
sufficient since one must also understand how this abstraction is 
used. As Strawson notes:
’’Variants on ’use1 in Wittgenstein are ’purpose’,
’function’,’role’, ’part’, ’application”’,
and the.aim of this central notion is to:
’’get us away from our fascination with the dubious 
relation of naming, of meaning, and to make us 
look at the speaking and writing of language as 
one human activity among others, interacting with 
others; and so to make us notice the different 
parts that words and sentences play in this activity.”
(Strawson 1970, p.25)
To someone who is still fascinated with the dubious relation of 
meaning, Wittgenstein says:
" ..you think of the meaning as a thing of the
same kind as the word, though also different from 
the word. Here the word, there the meaning. The 
money, and the cow that you can buy with it. (But
contrast: money, and its use)”
(Wittgenstein, 1955,120)
It is this contrast that Wittgenstein wants to bring out, and one way 
of doing so is to look at, what Wittgenstein calls, ’language-games’:
’’Here the term ’language-game’ is meant to bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is 
part of an activity, or of a form of life.”
(Wittgenstein 1953, 25)
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Examples of language-games include: "giving orders and obeying them", 
"reporting an event", forming and testing a hypothesis", "asking", 
"thanking", "cursing", etc. : (23) The notion of a language-game 
is an important one in Wittgenstein's work and we can see that the 
concept 'game' plays a dual role: it is used, both as an illustration 
to show that words do not necessarily have precise meanings, and 
also as a direct comparison with language: "games form a family, and 
so do the various activities, which come under the general description 
of 'using a language'." (Strawson 1970, p.32)
To demonstrate the way in which psychologists, as well as philosophers 
have ignored the functions of words, we can turn to another learning 
theory, this time based on various experiments, the results of which 
are used by Vygotsky to propose a process of concept formation (Vygotsky 
1962). . The concepts the subjects had to discover were denoted by 
four nonsense words: 'lag', 'bik', 'mur', 'cev'. The subjects were 
given twenty-two blocks of varying colour, weight, shape and size, 
and had to learn that, for example, 'lag' was tall and large, 'bik' 
was large and flat, etc., by looking for various common properties 
between blocks described by the same word. Thus like Bruner, Vygotsky 
investigates the ways in which,subjects abstract the attributes that 
distinguish exemplars from non-exemplars. Vygotsky then observed 
and described the various stages through which the subjects passed 
before arriving at the final, well-defined groupings.
Again, as with the experiments of Bruner et al, we cannot consider 
the above situation as a paradigm of concept learning. I think we 
are entitled to ask why the subject could not be taught the concepts 
by listing the attributes, for example, that ’lag’ was to be used
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in place of the two adjectives 'tali' ana1 large' etc. ivnen we asx 
this question, I think that it becomes clear that although the subject 
is learning new words, he is not learning new uses of words, or rather, 
the use he has learnt is a very restricted one. That is, he is able 
to use the words ’lag* ’bik’ 'mur' and ’cev' in connection with the 
activity of describing the twenty-two blocks, but he has not learnt 
how to use these words outside this activity. The words that he 
already knows, 'large1, 'tali’, ’flat', etc., he is able to use in 
many different language-games applied to many different types of 
objects, for example, sky-scrapers, dogs, matchboxes, lorries, needles, 
apples, etc. In the case of the four nonsense words, either the 
subject is unable to apply them to these various objects, or else 
he applies them in place of a conjunction of pairs of words he already 
knows. In the first case, the concept learning is hardly representative 
since the use of these words is far too restricted. If we look at 
the way a word such as ’large’ is used, I suggest that we will not 
be able to abstract the attribute for which it stands, but only 
observe family resemblances between the various objects described.
In the second case, where the words are used in place of pairs of 
known adjectives, the subject is not learning a new use, he is not 
learning new concepts. This is the same situation as the one in 
which Wittgenstein explains the meaning of words to someone who only 
speaks French, by means of the corresponding French words.
Thus, I think it is clear that learning a concept involves more than 
simply abstracting common attributes. To learn that ’lag' is used 
to describe tall, large blocks, does not, by itself mean that a new 
concept has been learnt since the word has no other use. Although 
a rule has been given, we do not know how to apply it outside the
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limited circumstances in which it was learnt; the word has no clear 
application in the normal activities associated with speaking and 
writing. .
3.2 Concepts in Science
The traditional view of a concept can also be found in the philosophy 
of science. In particular, Ravetz in "Scientific Knowledge and its 
Social Problems" (Ravetz 1973), proposes a definition of a concept 
that is clearly related to the traditional view. He maintains that 
in a scientific problem "the things discussed are not the objects 
and processes perceived through ordinary experience, but intellectual 
constructs." (p.72) "I describe these ’objects of inquiry1 as 
’classes of intellectually constructed things and events', rather 
than as 'concepts’, in order to stress what, for me, is their most 
important feature." (p.73)
Thus, according to Ravetz, a concept is a class of things or of events 
and as we see in the following quotation, where he tries to distinguish 
scientific from everyday concepts, this applies to all concepts:
"It might be objected that I have not yet shown 
any distinctive feature of scientific knowledge, 
for even our ordinary.speech and thinking are 
done with names, which are identifying tags for 
general classes of things and events. Moreover, 
these names, and their classes, are far from 
natural..... In this sense it is true that all
our knowledge is ’artificial’...... But the
objects of scientific knowledge are more arti­
ficial than this; to indicate the difference I 
have used the term ’intellectually constructed’.
(Ravetz 1973, p.113)
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We see that Ravetz is not concerned with demonstrating that concepts, 
in general, are classes of things and events; he accepts this, and 
then tries to show that scientific concepts are also classes of things 
and events, but differ in that they are more artificial. Thus, al­
though "chemical ’substance' and biological ’species' are less arti­
ficial than many objects of scientific knowledge, for their samples 
are things which have many properties accessible to fairly direct 
inspection" (p.112), nonetheless, a concept such as ’substance' is 
still an intellectually constructed class, since it "is not a form­
alised description of a unique collection of material; rather, it 
is a class of things, the members of the class being defined by 
their possession of certain properties." (p.Ill)
Consequently, since he takes it for granted that concepts are classes 
of things and events, Ravetz is not worried by the fact that in 
science "many conceptual classes have samples whose properties or 
even whose character as a ’thing’ or ’event’, are incapable of easy 
translation into ordinary experience." (pp.112/3). He goes on to 
state:
"....it is beside my present purpose to determine
whether the scientific concept is best considered 
as a class of ’things’ or of ’events’.......For
to the extent that their ontological status be­
comes obscure their character as intellectual 
constructs becomes apparent."
(my italics) (Ravetz 1973, p.113)
It must be clear from the preceding section that my criticism of 
Ravetz does not consist in suggesting that scientific concepts are 
not intellectually constructed, but in suggesting that concept words 
are not the names of classes. Thus I do not wish to counter Ravetz's
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main arguments that scientific concepts are artificial or intellect­
ually constructed, but to question his basic assumption as to the
nature of concepts in general, and hence scientific concepts in
particular. I therefore consider that it is for just those concepts, 
"whose character as intellectual constructs becomes apparent" that 
a demonstration is necessary in order to show that they are in fact 
classes at all.
Wittgenstein points out:
"One thinks that learning language consists in giving 
names to objects. Viz, to human beings, to shapes,
to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc.__
To repeat - naming is something like attaching a
label to a thing. One can say that this is pre­
paratory to the use of a word. But what is it a
preparation for?"
(Wittgenstein 1953, 26)
Thus we may want to say that the word ’substance* is a label attached 
to a class of things, but to simply attach a label to a class does not
show how the label is to be used. Thus to say that ’substance' refers
to a class of things does not give the meaning of the word; it does 
not tell us what the concept of a substance is. Nor do I think that 
on closer inspection it is possible to defend Ravetz’s suggestion 
that a word such as ’substance’ refers to a class "defined ’intentionally' 
by certain properties of its members" (p.Ill), the ’extension’ of 
which is determined by testing to see whether*a particular ’object’ 
"satisfies the defining properties of the member of the class to an 
acceptable degree" (p.112). When we realise that the term 'substance* 
has included among its members not only present day compounds and 
elements but also the ancient elements earth, air, fire and water, 
and the now discredited 'substances’ phlogiston and the aether, then 
I think that we must come to the conclusion, not that there is a
common defining property or set of properties, but rather that there 
is a network of inter-relationships.
If we are able to escape from the fascination of the relationship 
between naming and meaning, then I think it is even clearer in the 
case of concepts such as 'field*, 'mass', 'energy1, for which we 
cannot isolate things or events as samples, than it is for concepts 
such as 'substances', where we can isolate a class of things, that 
these terms are not the names of classes. Even if it were possible 
to isolate a class of things or events to which the word 'energy' 
referred, this class would not determine the meaning of the word 
'energy' since it plays no part in the teaching of the meaning of 
'energy' to someone. A student does not learn the concept 'energy' 
by being shown a class to which the word refers, nor by being told 
the defining properties of members of a class, but by seeing how the 
word is applied in various problem-solutions. That is, he learns 
the meaning of scientific concepts not by learning what the words 
refer to, but by learning how they are used,
Wittgenstein's criticisms of the traditional notion of a concept are 
clearly related to Kuhn's analysis of the nature of science. In 
particular, Wittgenstein's references to 'forms of life' can be seen 
for the scientist, as a 'paradigm', in the sense which Kuhn later 
termed metaphysical paradigm or disciplinary matrix, with which the 
scientist works. It is therefore useful to consider in more detail 
what Wittgenstein meant by 'form of.life'.
Wittgenstein uses the expression 'language-game' to "bring into 
prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an 
activity, or of a form of life." QVittgenstein 1953, 23) The 
term 'form of life' is used elsewhere in the Investigations, as in:
". . ..to imagine a language means to imagine a . (19)
form of life."
"(human beings) agree in the language they use. (241)
That is not agreement in opinions but in form 
.of life." '
"Can only those hope who can talk? Only those (page 174)
who have mastered the use of a language. That 
is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of 
this complicated form of life."
"What has to be accepted,' the given, is - so one (page 226) -
could say - forms of life."
(Wittgenstein 1953)
It is clear from these quotations, that ’forms of life’ is used to 
refer to "the human behaviour, the activities, the natural expressions 
that surround the words for that concept." (Malcolm 1968, p.91)
However, it is not immediately clear how restricted or how general 
an interpretation of the words ’behaviour’ and ’activity’ is intended.
This is associated in the Investigations with a similar vagueness 
in the term ’language-game’, which at times can be taken to mean a 
’game’ within language as a whole, and at other times, as language 
as a whole.
I think that the reason for this vagueness (and vagueness, as we 
have noted, is not necessarily a fault) is that, on the one hand, 
mankind as a whole shares the ability to speak, and underlying this 
must be some common characteristic that distinguishes man from other 
animals. Yet on the other hand, there are many different languages, 
which are not all perfectly translatable, one into another, and with­
in these languages there are various ’specialist languages’ (such as 
for example the ’language’ of chemistry) which are not understood 
by everyone who speaks the language, and underlying this must be 
corresponding differences in behaviour. Since, according to Wittgenstein,
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speaking a language is part of an activity or form of life then, 
there must be a 'form of life common to all human beings, but equally, 
the fact that people speak different languages-, in the sense of 
different tongues, such as English, French, etc., and different 
language-games, implies that there are different forms of life within 
that which is common. If to imagine a language means to imagine a 
form of life, what is meant by form of life will depend on how res­
tricted is the use of the term ’language’. We can say that, to the 
extent that people share a form of life they can communicate with 
each other.
I therefore think that it is quite consistent with Wittgenstein’s 
use of the expressions ’form of life1 and ’language-game’ to suggest 
that scientists within a community, and here we can make this as 
restricted or as general as we wish, can be said to share the same 
form of life, and to speak the same language-games. They are able 
to communicate with each other through sharing this form of life.
The paradigms of science, that is, the concrete puzzle-solutions 
that guide research, constitute language-games within these forms 
of life. Scientists within different communities share different 
forms of life in as much as they are guided by different paradigms, 
speak different language-games, and hence have difficulty communicating 
with each other.
3.3 Mathematical concepts used in science
It is the fact that mathematics and science are different language- 
games that denies us the possibility of being able to talk of trans-
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ferring concepts from the mathematics class to the science class.
A student may well learn mathematical concepts such as function, 
integral, limit, variable, etc., in his mathematics class, and he 
may well need mathematical concepts such as function, integral, limit, 
variable, etc., in his science class, but we cannot therefore con­
clude that we are talking about the same concepts in these two dif­
ferent language-games. That is we cannot conclude that words such 
as ’function1, ’variable’ etc., have the same meaning in the different 
1anguage-games.
If a concept were simply an abstraction from a class of things or 
events, then indeed we could talk of transferring concepts, in the 
same way that we talk of transferring skills. However, when we re­
place this simple picture of language with one in which it is recognised 
that a concept, that is the meaning of a word, is given by the use 
of a word, then this is no longer possible. A student cannot learn 
concepts in mathematics and then apply them in science, since the 
concepts that the student needs are often given by just these appli­
cations. It is true that the use of mathematical terms in science
will be related to the use of the terms in mathematics, but the two 
uses will seldom be identical.
Part of understanding a concept will be applying the term to various 
types of situations, and because a student is said to understand a 
concept in his mathematics class, it does not follow that he will 
be able to apply the term to the sorts of situations that he encounters 
in his science class. Hence, it does not follow that he will under­
stand what is, on the face of it, the same concept. In fact, as we 
have seen, it is not the same concept, but a related one.
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The objection might be made that if the student had really under­
stood the concept in his mathematics class, he would have been able 
to apply this in his science class. However, this begs the question 
of what we mean by understanding: it suggests that understanding is 
being able to apply a mathematical concept in a science class. It 
is in fact, one of the features of Wittgenstein’s treatment that 
a consideration of the nature of understanding cannot be avoided. 
Wittgenstein's treatment makes clear the relationship between con­
cepts and understanding, which is obscured when a concept is thought 
of as an abstracted principle or property. In order to be able to 
use the word ’understanding' there must be observable criteria, 
since otherwise there would be no difference between a right use 
and a wrong use. The criterion for the correct use of 'understanding', 
in relation to a concept, is given by the correct use of a concept 
word. Thus, since the uses of a term may be different in mathematics 
and science, there will be different criteria for understanding that 
concept.
- 14-
CRITERIA FOR UNDERSTANDING
4.1 Introduction
I would like to introduce this discussion of the nature of under­
standing by considering Vygotsky’s investigations into the relation­
ship between thought and speech. Most behavioural approaches tend 
to consider thought to be unobservable, and hence incapable of 
scientific investigation. However, Vygotsky, while still retaining 
a behavioural approach and scorning introspection as a valid scientific 
method, nonetheless embarked on a study of thought. He found a way 
of studying thought, or as he called it, inner speech, by observing 
a child’s linguistic development. Like Piaget, Vygotsky distinguishes 
three types of speech: ordinary vocal speech, egocentric speech, in 
which the young child holds ’conversations’ with himself, and inner 
speech. However he did not agree with Piaget’s original suggestion 
as to the relation between these three types. According to Vygotsky:
’’The primary function of speech, in both children 
and adults, is communication, social contact.
The earliest speech of the child is therefore 
essentially social. At first it is global and 
multifunctional; later its function becomes 
differentiated. At a certain age the social 
speech of the child is quite sharply divided 
into egocentric and communicative speech."
(Vygotsky 1962, p.19)
Thus Vygotsky has this to say about the development of speech and 
the relation between the types: -
"Egocentric speech as a separate linguistic form 
is the highly important genetic link in the trans­
ition from vocal to inner speech, an intermediate 
stage between the differentiation of the functions 
of vocal speech and the final transformation of one 
part of vocal speech into inner speech. It is this 
transitional role of egocentric speech that lends
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it such great theoretical interest. The whole 
conception of speech development differs profoundly 
in accordance with the interpretation given to the 
role of egocentric speech. Thus our schema of 
development - first social, then egocentric, then 
inner speech - contrasts both with the traditional, 
behaviourist schema—  vocal speech, whisper, inner 
speech - and with Piaget's sequence - from non­
verbal autistic thought through egocentric thought 
and speech to socialised speech and logical thinking.
In our conception, the true direction of the develop­
ment of thinking is not from the individual to the 
socialised, but from the social to the individual."
(Vygotsky 1962, pp.19/20)
Wittgenstein makes a similar point in the following passage: "An
’inner process' stands in need of outward criteria." (Wittgenstein 
1953, (580) This, as Malcolm points out, is why:
"Wittgenstein exhorts us, over and over, to bethink 
ourselves of how we learned to use this or that 
form of words or of how we should teach it to a
child. The purpose of this is to bring into
view those features of someone’s circumstances 
and behaviour that settle the question of whether 
words (e.g. ’He is calculating in his head’) 
rightly apply to him. Those features constitute 
the ’criterion’ of calculating in one’s head."
(Malcolm 1968, pp.83/4)
Thus Wittgenstein suggests:
"Ask yourself: would it be imaginable for someone 
to learn to do sums in his head without ever 
doing written or oral ones? - ’Learning if 
will mean: being made able to do it. Only the 
question arises, what will count as a criterion 
for being able to do it?
(Wittgenstein 1953, 385)
The notion of ’criterion’ is an important and difficult one in 
'Wittgenstein’s philosophy. His treatment of topics is inter-related 
and one way in which he considers what is meant by ’criteria for 
understanding' is to consider the criteria for being in pain. Thus 
we must consider how a child learns the meaning of the word ’pain’:
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"What would it be like if human beings shewed no 
outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace etc)?
Then it would be impossible to teach a child the 
use of the word ’tooth-ache'."
(Wittgenstein 1953, 257)
It is no answer to suggest that the child may be able to invent a 
word for the sensation of tooth-ache, since Wittgenstein points out 
that a private definition is no definition at all; it is the same as 
suggesting that the right hand should give the left hand money. 
Wittgenstein reminds us that "there are certain criteria in a man’s 
behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a word". (269)
If we return for a moment to the topic of understanding, the implic­
ation is that Wittgenstein is not denying that understanding may be 
accompanied, or may sometimes be accompanied, by a certain feeling 
or sensation. He is, however, pointing out that, by itself, this 
feeling is not sufficient, since it stands in need of outward criteria.
A child would not be able to learn the meaning of the word ’under­
stand’ simply by attending to an inner feeling. He is only able to 
learn the word, or perhaps more exactly, the word only has meaning 
within language, because there are typical behaviours of understanding. 
Thus, as Vygotsky suggested, a child first learns to use words in a 
social, communicative context, and is only later able to apply these 
words to his own feelings.
Now it might be thought that by demanding outward criteria for under­
standing, I am reverting to a behavioural stance, that I have explicitly 
denied, and am implying that it is possible to produce objectives 
for understanding. However, I think that Wittgenstein's behaviourism’ 
is significantly different from the psychological theories of 
Behaviourism and Neobehaviourism, If we propose an objective specifying
the behaviour that is to count as understanding, then the implication 
is that if a person satisfied this objective, then he has understood. 
That Wittgenstein would not accept this implication can be demon­
strated by looking at what Wittgenstein has to say about the relation­
ship between pain behaviour and being in pain: we can consider whether 
Wittgenstein would accept that satisfying the criteria for being in 
paid necessarily implies that a person is in pain. Malcolm suggests 
that Wittgenstein does not accept this: "A criterion is satisfied 
only in certain circumstances." (Malcolm 1968, p.85) That is, 
although a person may exhibit pain behaviour, which in certain circum­
stances we would accept as a criterion for his being in pain, in 
other circumstances, for example, where he had been hypnotised, or 
was in a play, etc., the same behaviour would not be accepted as a 
criterion. It might then be suggested that if we listed all these 
circumstances in which pain behaviour did not count as being in pain,
then, in all other circumstances we could be sure that pain behaviour
implied being in pain.
"But here we must be on our guard against thinking 
that there is some totality of conditions corres­
ponding to the nature of each case (eg. for a 
person's walking) so that, as it were, he could 
not but walk if they were all fulfilled."
(Wittgenstein 1953, 183)
As Malcolm adds to this:
"The list of circumstances......is not infinite, but-
indefinite. Therefore, entailment conditions can­
not be formulated; there are none."
(Malcolm 1968, p.86)
However,., as Malcolm goes on to point out, we are faced with the follow­
ing problem:
"....if it does not follow from his behaviour and 
circumstances that he is in pain, then how can it 
ever be certain that he is in pain? .... It looks
as if the conclusion ought to be that we cannot 
’completely verify’ that he is in pain. This con­
clusion is wrong, but it is not easy to see why."
(Malcolm 1968, p.87)
He interprets Wittgenstein as suggesting that:
".....there can be situations of real life in which
a question as to whether someone who groans is 
; pretending, or rehearsing, or hypnotised, or......
simply does not exist. ’Just try - in a real case - 
to doubt someone else's fear or pain' (Wittgenstein 
1953, 303) A doubt, a question, would be rejected
as absurd by anyone who knew the actual surroundings."
Thus, the fact that it does not logically follow from a person’s 
behaviour in particular circumstances that he is in pain, does not 
mean that, in an actual situation we need doubt whether he really 
is in pain (although, clearly, in some situations we might). Con­
versely, the fact that in a real case we can be certain from a 
person's behaviour that he is in pain, does not mean that we should 
be able to specify behavioural criteria in advance. A process of 
inference, from observing pain behaviour to knowing the person is 
in pain, is not an appropriate description here, since such a pro­
cess implies uncertainty and chance where there need be none.
We can draw an analogy between pain and understanding, and suggest 
that it is not possible to specify precise conditions which, if 
fulfilled, must imply understanding. That is, we must guard against 
thinking that there is a totality of conditions such that, if they 
were fulfilled* .a person must understand. Yet, this does not mean 
that, in a real situation there need be any doubt that a person has 
understood. Nor, does it mean that there are no circumstances in 
which we doubt whether a person has understood, but only that we 
could not doubt it in all circumstances. It should be clear now
(Malcolm 1968, pp.87/88)
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how Wittgenstein's account differs from the Behavioural accounts 
I considered earlier; although the 'inner process' of understanding 
stands in need of outward, that is, behavioural criteria, this does 
not imply that it is possible to list these criteria.
If we recall the previous chapter on concept learning, then we rem­
ember that it is often the use of a word in a language-game that 
supplies the outward criteria as to whether a person has understood 
a concept. Although the learning of a concept 'green', say, may 
involve forming a picture of pure green in the mind, to be used as 
a sample, this is an inner process that stands in need of outward 
criteria. The outward criteria of understanding the concept 'green' 
are the correct uses of the word 'green'. If, for example, a person 
were to say that an object was both red and green all over, we would
not understand him; we would say he was not using the word 'green'
according to the normal rules; that he did not understand the concept. 
Although we have said that the use of a word is governed by rules, 
these are not the rules of a mathematical calculus. The use of a 
word is not everywhere bounded by rules and so the rules cannot
specify in advance all those uses which are to be accepted as correct
ones, just as the rules of a game do not specify in advance which 
'moves' are correct. Whether or not a use is correct will depend on 
the circumstances in which it is used, and the circumstances in which 
a word might be used are obviously indefinite.
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4.2 Examples of particular circumstances
The above discussion of understanding can perhaps be made clearer 
by looking at a particular example and seeing what is meant by 
understanding in this case. An important example that Wittgenstein 
uses quite extensively is the following:
"A writes a series of numbers down; B watches him 
and tries to find a law for the sequence of numbers.
If he succeeds he exclaims: 'Now I can go on!'- So 
this capacity, this understanding, is something that 
makes its appearance in a moment. So let us try and 
see what it is that makes its appearance here. - 
A has written down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29;
at this point B says he knows how to go on. What
happened here? Various things may have happened; 
for example, while A was slowly putting one number 
after another, B was occupied with trying various 
algebraic formulae on the numbers which had been 
written down. After A had written the number 19,
B tried the formula: ^
a = n + n - 1 ;
. . n .
and the next number confirmed his hypothesis. Or
again, B does not think of formulae. He watches A 
writing his numbers down with a certain feeling of 
tension, and all sorts of vague thoughts go through 
his head. Finally he asks himself: 'What is the 
series of differences?' He finds the series 4, 6,
8, 10, and says: 'Now I can go on’. Or he watches 
and says: 'Yes, I know that series’ - and continues 
it, just as he would have done if A had written down 
the series 1, 3, 5, 7, 9. - Or he says nothing at all
and simply continues the series. Perhaps he had what 
might be called the sensation "that’s easy!". (Such 
a sensation is, for example, that of a light quick in­
take of breath, as when one is slightly startled.)
Wittgenstein then goes on to ask:
"But are the processes which I have described here 
understanding? ’B understands the principle of the 
series’ surely.doesn't mean simply: the formula a = .... 
occurs to B. For it is perfectly imaginable that 
the formula should occur to him and that he should 
nevertheless not understand. ’He understands' must 
have more in it than: the formula occurs to him. And 
equally, more than any of those more or less character­
istic accompaniments or manifestations of understanding."
(Wittgenstein 1953,151, 152) 
So Wittgenstein is suggesting that we are not satisfied that certain 
behaviour,4such as writing down the formula, continuing the series,
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having a 'light quick intake of breath', or certain sensations, 
such as the sensation 'that’s easy!' are the same thing as under­
standing. Instead they seem to be merely accompaniments. It is 
as if we were "trying to get hold of the mental process of under­
standing v/hich seems to be hidden behind those coarser and therefore
more readily visible accompaniments" (p.153) But if this is so, 
then we are looking for the wrong thing:
"If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance 
of the formula' it is particular circumstances, 
which justify me in saying I can go on - when 
the formula occurs to me.
"Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental 
process' at all. - For that is the expression 
which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what 
sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do
we say, 'now I know how to go on', when, that is,
the formula has occurred to me?"
(Wittgenstein 1953, 154)
We can relate this to the previous discussion on the use of objectives 
since, under some circumstances (but not others) achieving the follow­
ing objectives for example:
1. Given the first four terms of a simple series the student should 
be able to write out the following four terms;
2. Given the first four terms of a simple series the student should 
be able to write out the general term, a^ = .......,
may indicate that the student has succeeded in the aim of understanding 
the principle behind the series. But in general, the aim and the . 
objectives will not have the same sense, and we can imagine circum­
stances where the student achieves the objectives yet does not under­
stand the principle behind the series. (Notice however, that this 
lack of understanding would not be discovered by the teacher through 
some mysterious process, but, for example, by his observing that the 
student in other situations was not able to do certain things. Thus 
understanding depends on behaviour, it is not something 'mental' and
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unobservable. However, it is the particular circumstances that give 
meaning and significance to the behaviour.) On the other hand it is 
possible that the student has understood but fails to achieve the 
objectives due to factors within the particular situation, for example 
he was tired, etc. Thus, understanding will be manifested in dif­
ferent behaviour according to the circumstances. The teacher will 
often be able to judge when a student has understood something, and 
he can only do this by observing the student's behaviour, not by 
some mysterious insight into the student's mind. However this does 
not imply that it is possible to establish specific criteria of 
understanding nor state the general behaviour patterns to which the 
student will conform piror to the particular circumstances in which 
the understanding occurs.
I want to try and enlarge on this by, as it were, 'filling out' 
Wittgenstein's example in two different ways. In both cases, B's 
behaviour will be the same, but I think it will be clear that in 
the first case the particular circumstances do not justify us saying 
that B understands, whereas in the second they do.
Situation 1: A student, S, has just completed a course on mathe­
matical series and has been warned in advance that he will be given 
a test on what was taught in the course. In this test he is asked 
to write down the formula for the following series of numbers: 1, 5,
9, 13, ..... S writes down the (correct) formula a^ = 4(n-l) + 1.
Situation 2: Two people, X and Y, are discussing Wittgenstein's
example and X suggests that B could show that he had understood what 
was meant by a series by giving another example, Y comments "That is
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all very well, but what would you accept as another example?” "What 
do you mean?" replies X. "Well, you would probably accept 1, 2,4,
7, .... as another example. But would you accept.....". Y thinks
a moment before carrying on. "Would you accept, say, 1, .... .39,. ....
ah, ..... , would you think he had understood what a series was?"
They continue this discussion further. Meanwhile, Z, who has overheard 
this, starts scribbling on a piece of paper. A little while later 
he hands a slip of paper across to X and Y, on which is written 
a^ =......., the formula for a series starting 1, 39,%,.... in
which the first differences form an arithmetic series, just as in 
1V ?, 4, 7, ..... . '
Let us now consider in a little more detail the particular features 
that distinguish the two situations:
(a) S had just attended a course and had had an opportunity to revise. 
He was sitting in an examination in which he knew he might well have
to produce a formula of the form aR = ...... On the other hand, Z
was in an informal situation for which he had had no specific pre­
paration,-'.
(b) Since examination questions are specially prepared, S had every 
reason to suppose that it was possible to produce a quite simple 
formula for the series. However, in the second situation, Y was 
inventing the numbers as he went along, to try to demonstrate that
a series was not any string of numbers.
(c) The first series looks like a series that has a formula, that 
is, it has a similar form of appearance to series that we commonly
see. The numbers 1, 39, Af, do. not have this familiar appearance.
Although the behaviour is the same in both cases, I think it is clear 
that in the second case it would have been absurd for X and Y to have
doubted that Z had understood the principle behind the series. Doubt 
would not even have arisen. However, we might also suggest various 
intermediate examples in which judgement is not so clear, that is* 
where we may think that a person has understood, but where we also 
have a nagging doubt that he has not. Yet we should also bear in 
mind that it would not be possible to doubt that a person had under­
stood on every occasion. If someone were to do so we should assume • 
that he did not know how we used the word ’understand1. It is not 
the case that: "we are in doubt because it is possible for us to 
imagine a doubt.” (Wittgenstein 1953, 84)
4.3 Bloom1s Taxonomy of Educational Objectives
To see how this approach to understanding differs from a behavioural
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approach (where, incidentjly, the temptation to think of understanding 
as a 'mental* process is not allowed) we can consider the Taxonomy 
of Educational Objectives which sets out to: "provide for classification 
of the goals of our educational system. It is expected to be of 
general help to all teachers/administrators, professional specialists, 
and research workers who deal with curricular and evaluation problems.
It is expecially intended to help them discuss these problems with 
greater precision." (Bloom 1956, p.l) The Taxonomy was planned in 
three parts, of which the first two, covering the cognitive and 
affective domains are the most important. I have already commented 
on the distinction between cognitive and affective learning, and 
the discussion in this chapter will be confined to the first Handbook 
dealing with the cognitive domain. It is undoubtedly true that since
the Taxonomy was first published it has had a major influence on 
educational thought. As Eggleston comments:
"The aim of the authors of the taxonomy was that 
it should be communicable, comprehensive, stimu­
lating to thought concerning educational problems, 
and acceptable and useful to workers in the field.
There is evidence that a substantial measure of 
success has been achieved."
(Eggleston 1969, p.81)
The main uses to which the Taxonomy has been put are in the construction 
of tests, where it has often resulted in an extension of the types 
of questions asked, and in the classification of objectives.
However, Sockett makes the point that "empirical validation of the 
Taxonomy has so far been relatively scarce" and "philosophical critic- 
sim has been positively scanty". (Sockett 1971, p.16) Sockett con­
siders that the "over-riding criticism is that the Taxonomy operates 
with a naive theory of knowledge which cannot be ignored however 
classificatory and neutral its intentions". This criticism is de­
veloped in his article (Sockett 1971) and in a subsequent article 
by Pring (Pring 1971). The criticisms that I would like to develop 
in this chapter are different from those developed by Sockett and 
Pring, although they are also concerned with the foundations of the 
Taxonomy and do draw on some points made by Sockett and Pring.
These criticisms will, I hope, show more clearly what Bloom et al 
have achieved, by removing those claims that seem to me, to be un­
founded. The main areas of criticism will concentrate on the assumpt­
ions made about learning, the terms or categories defined by the 
Taxonomy, and what it is that these terms are categorising. The 
basis of my criticisms will be a questioning of the assumptions 
that: (i) it is always possible to describe educational outcomes in 
terms of behaviour, and (ii) these descriptions can be made precise 
and unambiguous.
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When preparing the first part of the proposed taxonomy, Bloom and 
his colleagues started from a long list of educational objectives 
gathered from various institutions and from the literature, which 
were thought to lie in the cognitive domain. They then established 
principles that would serve as guidelines in classifying these objectives. 
First:
"....the major distinctions teachers make among student 
behaviours. These distinctions are revealed in the 
ways teachers state educational objectives."
Second:
”....the taxonomy should be logically developed 
and internally consistent."
Third: V;
"....the taxonomy should be consistent with our 
present understanding of psychological phenomena.
Those distinctions which are psychological^ un­
tenable, even though regularly made by teachers, 
would be avoided. Further, distinctions which 
seem psychologically important, even though not 
frequently made in educational objectives, would 
be favourable considered for inclusion."
And finally:
"....the classification should be a purely descriptive 
scheme in which every type of educational goal can 
be represented in a relatively neutral fashion."
(Bloom 1956, pp.13/14)
Once these had been formulated, the group started classifying the 
educational objectives they had collected by first determining "which 
part of the objective stated the behaviour intended and which stated 
the content or object of the behaviour. We then attempted to find 
divisions or groups into which the behaviours could be placed."
This was done by ordering the objectives into various divisions from 
simple to complex. These were then subdivided, in some cases several 
times. Each of these subdivisions were then defined "in such a way
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that all of us working with the material could communicate with 
each other about the specific objectives as well as the testing 
procedures" (Bloom 1956, p.15) In this way the group arrived at 
the following six major classes which the group felt represented 
"something of the hierachical order of the different classes of 
objectives", in the.cognitive domain:
1.00 Knowledge
2.00 Comprehension
3.00 Application
4.00 Analysis
5.00 Synthesis
6.00 Evaluation.
A condensed version of the taxonomy is included in the appendix of 
the book to give an overall view of the classification system and 
the way the categories have been defined, along with examples of 
objectives in each category. Therefore I will not attempt to produce 
a similar, even more condensed version here, but will try to indicate 
with the use of a small number of examples, the sorts of subdivisions 
and definitions that Bloom et al. propose. First, examples of the 
major classes: Knowledge "involves the recall of specifics and
universals, the recall of methods or processes, or the recall of a 
pattern, structure, or setting" (p.201); Comprehension "represents 
the lowest level of understanding. It refers to a type of under­
standing or apprehension such that the individual knows what is 
being communicated and can make use of the material or idea being 
communicated without necessarily relating it to other material or 
seeing its fullest implications", (p.204)
The first class contains the most subclasses. Thus Knowledge is 
divided into: 1.10 Knowledge of Specifics, 1.20 Knowledge of Ways 
and Means of Dealing with Specifics, 1.30 Knowledge of the Universals 
and Abstractions in a Field. Each of these is further subdivided, 
for example: 1.11 Knowledge of Terminology, 1.24 Knowledge of Criteria, 
etc. Most of the other classes are also subdivided, for example 
Comprehension contains three subclasses: 2.10 Translation, 2.20 
Interpretation, 2.30 Extrapolation. Each of these subclasses is 
also given a definition, for example, Knowledge of Specifics is 
defined as the ’’recall of specific and isolable bits of information.” 
(p.201), and the Knowledge of Specific facts as ’’Knowledge of dates, 
events, persons, places, etc.” (p.201). Translation is comprehension 
"as phrased or rendered from one language or form of communication 
to another” and Interpretation is the "explanation or summarisation 
of a communication” (p.204/205).
One of the initial purposes of the taxonomy was to provide a framework 
that would allow for communication among examiners. The first draft 
was therefore tried out on a large number of people within education 
to see whether they would agree in their classification of specific 
objectives and test materials. The taxonomy was also used, by the 
group that produced it, to classify a large number of objectives.
In this way it was hoped both to eliminate ambiguities and to ensure 
the taxonomy’s comprehensiveness. This resulted in the final version 
in which the classes and sub-classes of educational objectives are 
defined in three ways:. , .
"The first and major type of definition is represented 
by verbal description or definition of each class and 
sub-class.... .A second type of definition is provided 
by the list of educational objectives which are 
included under each sub-class of the taxonomy.....The 
third type of definition attempts to make clear the
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behaviour appropriate to each category by 
illustrations of the examination questions and 
problems which are regarded as appropriate. In ' 
a way, this represents the most detailed and 
precise definition of the sub-class since it 
indicates the tasks the student is expected to 
perform and the specific behaviour he is expected 
to exhibit.”
'(Bloom 1956, p.44/45)
4.4 Assumptions about learning in the taxonomy
The classification of objectives from simple to complex is based on 
a behavioural picture of learning: the taxonomy is not simply a 
classification, it implies relationships between the various classes.
"Taxonomies have certain structural rules
which exceed in complexity the rules of a 
classification system."
(Bloom 1956, p.,17)
Although the taxonomy is supposedly organised along lines which 
take account of the distinctions made by teachers, Sockett claims 
that in practice "the psychological considerations are over-riding." 
(Sockett 1971, p.22) These psychological considerations are the 
behavioural directives we have already seen. The tension between 
the educational considerations on the one hand, and the behavioural 
directives on the other probably accounts for the confusion, noted 
by Eggleston (see below) in the description of the arrangement.
Thus Bloom et al , state that the present arrangement of the major 
■ .classes:
"appears to us to represent something of the 
hierachical order of the different classes of 
objectives. As we have defined them, the 
objectives in one class are likely to make 
use of and be built on the behaviours found 
in the preceeding classes in the list."
(Bloom 1956, p.18)
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However, lower down-the same page, it is suggested that:
"Our attempt to arrange educational behaviours 
from simple to complex was based on the idea that 
a particular simple behaviour may become integrated 
with other equally simple behaviours to form a 
more complex behaviour. Thus our classification 
may be said to be in the form where behaviours 
of type A form one class, behaviours of type B 
form another class, while behaviours of type 
ABC form still another class." (That is, based 
on a behavioural directive)
(Bloom 1956, p.18)
Eggleston comments that the latter method of description:
"...could possibly lead to eroneous assumptions.
At one point in the description of the taxonomy 
this statement occurs: !...so long as the simple 
behaviours may be viewed as components of the 
more complex behaviours, we can view the educ­
ational process as one of building on the simple 
behaviours’. This statement comes dangerously 
near to the assumption that this taxonomy of 
intended behavioural outcomes, ranked in order 
of complexity, is equivalent to an order in which 
the objectives will be attained."
(Eggleston 1969, p.81)
In parenthesis Eggleston, generously, suspects that such an assumpt­
ion is "far from Bloom’s real intentions", yet, I do not feel that 
this suspicion is grounded. The assumption, which Eggleston sug­
gests Bloom comes near to making, is an assumption which forms the 
basis of behaviourism and Bloom says, in several places, that he 
accepts this framework. Also, the two different descriptions appear 
throughout the taxonomy to such an extent that suggests that Bloom 
et al were unaware of the differences between them, or accepted the 
consequences of both of them.
The tension between educational and psychological considerations, 
that produces the above conflicting descriptions of the organisation 
of the taxonomy also produces a confusion over what is being class-
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ified, According to Bloom/ one of the first problems raised in 
the group discussions was whether or not educational objectives 
could be classified since they:
”....were attempting to classify phenomena which 
could not be observed or manipulated in the same 
concrete form as the phenomena of such fields as 
the physical and biological sciences, where 
taxonomies of a very high order have already 
been developed. Nevertheless, it was the view 
of the group that educational objectives stated 
in behavioural form have their counterparts in 
the behaviour of individuals. Such behaviour 
can be observed and described, ana these des­
criptive statements can be classified."
CBloom 1956, p.5)
The same point is taken up later when Bloom et al state:
"We are of the opinion that although the objectives 
and test materials and techniques may be specified 
in an almost unlimited number of ways, the student 
behaviours involved in these objectives can be 
represented by a relatively small number of classes. 
Therefore, this taxonomy is designed to be a 
classification of the student behaviours which 
represent the intended outcomes of the educational 
process."
(Bloom 1956, p.12)
This assumption that a person’s behaviour can be described precisely, 
and that a classification of these descriptions is equivalent to 
a classification of behaviour is, I suggest, a fundamental error.
Once Bloom et al have committed this error, the ambiguity in the 
ways of describing the ordering of the taxonomy automatically follow. 
The simple/complex ordering can have two different meanings, accord­
ing to whether we are ordering objectives or behaviours. The simple/ 
complex ordering of objectives is, as Bloom implies in the first 
description, on page 18, an easy/difficult ordering, with the more 
difficult, and hence higher order objectives building on the easier 
objectives. However, Bloom also suggests that there is a simple/ 
complex ordering of behaviours, which can be more accurately des-
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cribed as an elementary/composite ordering, that corresponds to the 
ordering of obj ectives.
The ordering of objectives- on an easy/difficult scale is much more 
easily defended than the ordering of behaviours on an elementary/ 
composite scale. Wittgenstein, in a different context, makes the 
following comments about simple and composite:
"But what are the simple constituent parts of which 
reality is composed? - What are the constituent 
parts.of a chair? - The bits of wood of which it 
is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? - ‘Simple’ 
means: not composite. And here the point is: in 
what sense ’composite’? It makes no sense at all 
to speak absolutely of the ’simple parts of a chair’.
’’... .We use the word ’composite’ (and therefore the 
word ’simple’) in an enormous number of different 
and differently related ways. (Is the colour of a 
square on a chessboard simple, or does it consist 
of pure white and pure yellow? And is white simple, 
or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? - 
Is this length of 2 cm. simple, or does it consist 
of two parts, each 1 cm. long? But why not one bit 
3 cm. long, and one bit 1 cm. long measured in the 
opposite direction?)’1
(Wittgenstein 1953, 47)
The only indication Bloom et al give as to what they mean by com­
posite is in the quotation above (see page 91) where complex behaviour 
is an integration of ’equally simple behaviours”. Since there is, 
however, no indication of what constitutes a simple behaviour, this 
definition is of little help. We can infer from the taxonomy that, 
for example, ’recall of bits of information’ is ’simple’ behaviour, 
but we are given no evidence that this is in fact simpler than, for 
example,’knowing what is being communicated’ or ’being able to make 
use of the material being communicated'. Nor are we told what 'equally 
simple' behaviour is integrated with., for example ’recall of inform­
ation' to produce the behaviour 'knowing what is being communicatedf. 
Even if we were to suggest that the two behaviours were ’recall’ and
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'making use of what is recalled', then on what grounds can these be 
called 'equally simple', and in what sense are they integrated?
On the other hand, we can talk about an ordering of objectives on 
an easy/difficult scale, and these difficulties do not arise. The 
suggestion that in order to 'recognise unstated assumptions' (A.nalysis) 
one needs to 'use abstractions' (Application), 'explain or summarise 
communication’ (Comprehension), and 'recall specific bits of inform­
ation' (Knowledge), is supported, not by a theory of learning, but 
by common experience, Consequently, the justification required for 
such an ordering is a lot less than is required for the claim that 
there is a class of behaviours corresponding to 'recognition of un­
stated assumptions' which is produced by the integration of simpler 
behaviours corresponding to 'use of abstraction', 'summarisation of 
communication', etc. In the first case one is simply describing a 
general experience, for which there are exceptions; in the second 
case one is proposing a specific mechanism, for which exceptions are 
not allowed (or at any rate, must be explained).
The evidence that is given for the hierachy in fact supports an 
ordering of objectives, according to difficulty, rather than of 
behaviours, according to complexity. Bloom et al claim that:
.problems requiring knowledge of principles and 
concepts are correctly answered more frequently 
than problems requiring both knowledge of the 
principle and some ability to apply it in new 
situations. Problems requiring analysis and 
synthesis are more difficult than problems re­
quiring comprehension."
{gloom 1956, p.19)
In order to use this to support the elementary/composite ordering 
of behaviour, Bloom et al have to distort this finding by assuming 
that: "problems requiring behaviour A alone should be answered correctly
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more frequently than problems requiring AB.". (p.18), an assumption 
for which no justification is given. There is also the fact that 
the tests for communicability of the taxonomy asked teachers and 
examiners to use the taxonomy to classify objectives and test items. 
The tests did not ask for student behaviours to be classified.
Thus the agreement that Bloom et al obtained was agreement as to 
how to classify objectives but not agreement as to how to classify 
behaviour.
4,5 Terms defined by the taxonomy ,
Before we can consider in greater depth the terms that are defined 
and used in the taxonomy, I wish to establish that the objectives on
which the taxonomy is based are not precise enough to warrant the
claim that it also provides for a classification of behaviour. In 
order to do this I shall consider examples of objectives from the 
various categories:
2.10 Translation: The ability to translate a lengthy part of a 
communication into briefer or more abstract terms.
3.00 Application: The ability to relate principles of civil liberties
and civil rights to current events.
4.20 Analysis of Relationships: Skill in comprehending the inter­
relationships among the ideas in a passage.
5.30 Derivation of a Set of Abstract Relations: Ability to make 
mathematical discoveries and generalisations.
6.20 Judgement in Terms of External Criteria: The comparison of major
*
theories, generalisations, and facts about particular cultures.
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Now I: think it is clear that these objectives are behavioural in 
the sense that they ask the student to do something; that is, they 
ask for action by the student. Yet it is equally clear that they 
do not satisy Mager’s criteria that objectives should state unambig­
uously what the student should do. I think it is true to say that 
Bloom et al have accepted a wider definition of the word 'behaviour' 
than have Mager or Sullivan. For Mager, ’behaviour’ means 'overt 
action’ and this implies such observable, easily identifiable activities 
as reciting, writing, etc.... However, Bloom et al have accepted a 
definition, which may be described as ’meaningful action'. Thus, 
for example, they ask a student to 'translate' into^ 'briefer or more 
abstract terms', and therefore, although they are asking for behaviour 
such as writing, this behaviour must be meaningful. Hence the 
behaviour is not specified unambiguously, since it needs judgement 
to decide whether a particular piece of writing is a translation into 
more abstract terms. Inevitably the need for interpretation will 
introduce ambiguities since it is no longer a question of simply 
observing the overt actions of the student, or the products of such 
actions, but of judging whether what is observed is to count as 
translation. This argument applies equally to the other objectives 
given. .
Furthermore, I do not see how it would be possible to make the object­
ives more specific, for it seems to me, as was the case for under­
standing, that there is no particular behaviour (that is no overt 
actions) that corresponds to translation; that is, there is no single 
thing that is common to all instances of translation, but rather a 
network of inter-relations between different instances. (Moreover,
I think it is possible to argue, at least in theory, that even
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behaviour such as 'writing' is not as unambiguous as Mager maintains, 
since it is implicit that this writing must be intentional and did 
not happen by chance, as is also implied by Mager’s use of the word 
’action', rather than, say, 'movement’.)
Once it is accepted that the objectives used by Bloom are not un­
ambiguous it is clear that the teacher has to use his judgement in 
deciding whether particular behaviour is to count as an achievement 
of the objective. Therefore, the particular circumstances in which 
this behaviour occurs become a factor that will affect the teacher's 
decision. It is the particular circumstances that justify the use 
of the word ’understanding’, and I suggest that this applies equally 
to the words used in the above objectives, We can ask, for example, 
is the student translating or reciting from memory? Is he making 
mathematical discoveries or has he learnt these before?, etc.
Bloom et al appear to recognise this type of objection when they 
comment that "two boys may appear to be doing the same thing; but 
if we analyse the situation, we find they are not". (Bloom 1956, p.15/16) 
However they dismiss this objection by suggesting that the only im­
portant factor is the "student's background of experience" (p.16), 
which is then assumed to be the same as "the learning situations 
which have preceded the test." (p.51). It is then assumed that it 
is possible to analyse the relationship between the test problems 
and the preceding learning situation. In this way Bloom et al suggest 
that it is possible for the teacher, knowing what he has taught the 
class, to classify test questions. Thus Bloom et al recognise that ' -
it is not only behaviour but also the circumstances in which this 
behaviour occurs, that is important, but they do not realise the
profound implications of this, namely that the objectives are not. 
simply descriptions of behayiour but also imply a certain type of 
situation in which this behaviour takes place. This reveals the 
basic flaw in the assumption that the taxonomy is a hierarchical 
ordering of behaviours, for if the same behaviour can be classified 
differently according to the different circumstances in which it 
occurs, then it cannot be the case that a test problem is classified 
higher in the taxonomy because it requires behaviour that consists 
of the integration of simpler behaviours. Instead it can only be 
that a test problem is classified higher because, due to the parti­
cular circumstances, it is more difficult than it would be in other 
circumstances.
Pring suggests how Bloom came to make this error when he examines 
the precise way in which Bloom uses the terms. He asks:
"Has he developed a technical use of these terms 
such that appeal to what they normally mean is 
just irrelevant? This might be the case. If it 
is, then one requires two things - firstly, that 
the technical use should be clearly defined and, 
secondly, that such a use will be preserved con­
sistently throughout the taxonomy. However, upon 
examination, it is not possible to find a closely 
defined technical use of these terms which is con­
sistently applied. Either Bloom does try to limit 
his use of these terms in which case it is not con­
sistently applied or he does not limit his use of 
these terms, in which case he trades on their 
ordinary usage and thereby introduces all the 
complicated epistemology that lies beneath that 
usage." .
(Pring 1971, p.88)
Thus the point being made here is, do the terms used in the taxonomy 
have their ordinary meaning, in which case, surely it would be nec­
essary to show that achievement of the objectives in particular cate­
gories constitutes what is normally meant by the category term, or 
has Bloom introduced a technical use. A technical use of these terms
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would require that Bloom et al should then use these terms consist­
ently, and not also trade on their ordinary use. The validity of 
Pring’s criticism that Bloom et al do in fact trade on the ordinary 
usage of the terms can be shown, I think, by considering how Bloom 
et al managed to communicate the meanings of these terms.
In the previous chapter I considered Wittgenstein’s remark that the 
meaning of a word is determined by its use and cannot be specified 
just by a definition since the use of a word cannot be completely 
bounded by a rule. We saw that Wittgenstein says:
" - I shall explain these words to someone who, 
say, only speaks French by means of the corres­
ponding French words. But if a person has not 
yet got the concepts, I shall teach him to use 
the words by means of examples and by practice.”
(Wittgenstein 1953, p.208) 
This, I suggest, is just what Bloom et al have done: they have ex­
plained the meaning of their terms by means of examples. Contrary 
to what they claim (see above page 8,), that the definitions are the v  
most important part of the taxonomy, it is the examples and test 
questions that in fact define the categories. As Wittgenstein puts 
it; "we sometimes demand definitions for the sake not of their con­
tent, but of their form" (Wittgenstein 1953, 217). The way the
terms in the taxonomy are to be used, and hence their meaning, is 
given by the examples that illustrate each category not by the defin­
itions of each category. But, as we saw above, these objectives 
contain words such as ’translate’, ’relate’, ’discover’, etc., and 
since they are nowhere defined, they must be assumed to have their 
normal fheaning. Hence Bloom et al, can be seen to be trading off the 
everyday meanings of the use of these words in the examples that, in 
fact, give meaning to the terms of the taxonomy. If Bloom et al wanted
-99-
to introduce technical definitions of the terms used, then they would 
have to couch the objectives, used to illustrate the different cate­
gories, in terms such as ’write’, ’recite1, etc. We see therefore, 
that the descriptions of each category of the taxonomy do not provide 
for any unambiguous use the terms that are supposedly defined by 
them. If anything, it is the examples of objectives and test questions 
that show how the terms are used. Therefore, since these objectives - 
and questions depend on the ordinary meanings of words such as ’trans­
late’, ’relate’, ’judge’, etc., the categories, as categories of 
behaviour, can be no more precise than the meanings of these words.
Although we may wish to give a more precise meaning to ’understanding* 
we certainly cannot do this in the way that Bloom and his colleagues 
have tried to. The meanings of-everyday words such as ’knowledge’ 
’understanding’, etc., are learnt through seeing examples of various 
behaviour in various circumstances, which are related in many dif­
ferent ways: there is what we have called a family resemblance between 
these different behaviours and circumstances. If we wish to intro­
duce new meanings for these words, this is not something that can be 
done by definitions.
Thus Bloom and his colleagues have succeeded in classifying objectives, 
but the classes of objectives do not necessarily represent different 
classes of behaviour, and they certainly do not represent different 
classes of understanding. In general, the higher order objectives 
will be more difficult than the lower order ones, simply because 
they incorporate the lower order ones. Indirectly what Bloom et al 
have done, is to draw attention to the different types of circumstances 
in which we use the word ’understand': in some cases a claim that a
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person has understood is justified by his applying certain knowledge, 
in others by his abstracting from a text, in yet others by his trans­
lating a text, and so on. However, these different behaviours are 
simply the different criteria that we are prepared to accept for 
the correct use of the word ’understanding’; they do not stand for 
different types of understanding.
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GAGNE’S ’CONDITIONS OF LEARNING'
5.1 Types of Learning
Having seen how the behavioural directives have been applied within 
educational technology, I now want to look at an account of learning 
based on behaviourism. Gagne, in his book 'The Conditions of Learn­
ing' (Gagne 1970), sets out to describe the conditions under which 
learning occurs. However/despite his claim that he is merely 
describing learning and not putting forward a theory of learning, 
his account, as we shall see, is based on behavioural directives.
A close analysis of these directives and of the application of this
account of learning to the learning of language, will, I hope, fin­
ally demonstrate the inappropriateness of an approach to educational 
problems (such as those associated with mathematics for science
students) that is based on such directives.
Gagne suggests that the conditions required for learning are both
'internal', that is, the capabilities that the learner requires for 
a particular type of learning, and 'external1, by which Gagne means 
the observable learning situation. According to Gagne:
"...‘.there are as many varieties of learning as
there are distinguishable conditions for learning.
In searching for and identifying these, one must
look, first, at the capabilities internal to the
learner, and second, at the stimulus situation
outside the learner. Each type of learning starts 
from a different 'point' of internal capability, 
and is likely also to demand a different external 
situation in order to take place effectively,"
(Gagne 1970, p.24)
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In all, Gagne isolates eight different types of learning/ arranged 
in a hierarchical order, where, according to Gagne, the higher types 
build on the lower types, so that the lower order types of learning 
feature as internal conditions for the higher order types. These 
are: Signal Learning, Stimulus-Response Learning, Chaining, Verbal 
Association, Discrimination Learning, Concept Learning, Rule Learn­
ing, Problem Solving.
Type 1: Signal Learning. "The individual learns to make a general, 
diffuse response to a signal. This is the classical conditioned 
response of Pavlov." (p.63)
Type 2: Stimulus-Response Learning. "The learner acquires a pre­
cise response to a discriminated stimulus." (p.63) According to 
Gagne, this is probably the building block of all higher learning.
We shall see that Stimulus-Response learning appears among the con­
ditions Gagne gives for all higher learning. According to Gagne, 
Stimulus-Response learning is easily observed in the field of animal 
learning (where it originated), but is seldom observed in its pure 
form in humaji, learning. Instead, what is observed are the more com­
plex forms of chains of Stimulus-Response or verbal associations.
Gagne accounts for this by saying that human beings rapidly acquire 
this background of learning which then enters into more complex 
learning. He suggests that this "form of learning appears to governv 
the acquisition of a new vocalisation habit of a young child." (p.41)
Type 3 and 4: Chaining and Verbal Association. In chaining the 
learner acquires "a,chain of two or more stimulus-response connections" 
(p.63). "Verbal association is the learning of chains that are verbal"
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(p.65). The formation of chains, both verbal and motor, is dependent 
on the learner first having acquired the individual links.
Type 5: Discrimination Learning. The learning of different chains 
tend to interfere with each other, and discrimination learning involves 
acquiring the ability to recognise different stimuli and make the 
appropriate identifying responses. As before, this is built upon 
the previous types, since the learner must first have learnt the : 
individual chains connecting each distinctive stimulus with its 
identifying response.
Type 6: Concept Learning. "The learner acquires a capability of 
making a common response to a class of stimuli that may differ from 
each other widely in physical appearance. He is able to make a 
response that identifies an entire class of objects or events".
(pp.63/64) Gagne makes it clear that he is considering "....the 
most fundamental meaning of the term ’concept', which is exhibited 
in individual behaviour by responding to a class of observable 
objects or object qualities...." (p.172). As before, concept learn- 
, ing is based on previous types of learning. "Prerequisites to the 
learning of concepts are capabilities that have previously been 
established by multiple discrimination. A set of verbal (or other) 
chains must have previously been acquired to representative stimulus 
situations that exhibits the characteristics of the class that des­
cribes the concept, and that distinguish these stimuli from others 
not included in the class," (p.180 - original italics)
Type 7: Rule Learning. "In simplest terms, a rule is a chain of 
two or more concepts" (p,64). This learning is according to Gagne,
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truly representative of human intellectual capacity, yet is built 
up from previous learning types. Included in rule learning is the 
learning of ’abstract concepts’ (as opposed to the previous 'concrete 
concepts’) which are defined by a rule that relates two or more 
simpler concepts, Gagne defines a rule as "an inferred capability 
that enables the individual to respond to a class of stimulus situ­
ations with a class of performances’’ (p.191). These rules are not 
normally learnt in isolation but in related sets. The rules of the 
set are related to each other "in the psychological sense that the 
learning of some are prerequisite to the learning of others....."
(p.203). In this way we can arrive at a learning hierachy in which, 
not only may two or more concrete concepts be subordinate to a rule, 
but also two or more rules may be subordinate to a further rule.
This rule may then itself be combined with one or more other rules 
to produce another, even higher order, rule. ’’The entire set of 
rules, organised in this way, forms a learning hierachy that des­
cribes an on the average efficient route to the attainment of an 
organised set of intellectual skills that represent ’understanding’ 
of a topic." (p.204)
Type 8; Problem Solving. "Problem solving is a kind of learning 
that requires the internal events usually called thinking. Two or 
more previously acquired rules are somehow combined to produce a 
new capability that can be shown to depend on a ’higher order’ rule" 
(p.64). Problem solving is thus a natural extension of rule learn­
ing. It can be classed as learning since it not only requires the 
use of rules to achieve a particular goal, but also in the process 
the learner discovers for himself new, higher-order rules which he 
is able to use in other situations, Obviously, this problem solving
requires that the learner has previously acquired a set of rules, 
.which in turn depend on the prior learning of concepts, discrimin­
ations, etc. Thus problem solving can be seen as being at the top 
of the hierachy of learning types.
5.2 Relevance to teaching problems
Gagne has claimed to have described the conditions necessary for 
all types of learning, where these conditions are both internal and 
external. If therefore, this claim is valid, then it should be 
possible to describe the types of learning that obtain when learning 
mathematics for science. In this way, it should be possible to 
produce a learning hierachy or learning map for the students. The 
purpose of arriving at such a hierachy is that according to Gagne, 
"the superordinate capability will be more readily learned (on the 
average, throughout a group of students) if the subordinate capa­
bilities have been previously acquired and are readily available 
for recall." (p.239) Thus, if these claim* are valid, then the 
problems associated with teaching mathematics to science students 
could be solved, or at least reduced to a minimum, by producing such 
hierarchies. Although the hierarchies represent the internal con­
ditions, rather than the external conditions, they nonetheless assist 
the planning of a sequence of instruction.
"Thus it becomes possible to 'work backward' from 
any given objective of learning to determine what 
the prerequisite learnings must be - if necessary 
all the way back to chains and simple discrimin­
ations, When such an analysis is made, the result 
is the kind of map of what must be learned."
(Gagne 1970, p ,242)
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To obtain a learning hierarchy, we start from the end-point and ask: 
"What would the student have to know how to do in order to be instruct­
ed in this rule?" (p.207). Thus we arrive at lower order rules or 
concepts and we can repeat the process with each of these. This pro­
cess can again be repeated until we arrive at a complete enough des­
cription of learning. Gagne gives several.examples of such hier­
archies, in English, Mathematics and Science. For the learning hier­
archy in science, Gagne started with the topic "solving physical work 
problems", and suggested that in order to solve these problems, the 
student has to learn the following sorts of capabilities:
"1. determining the numerical values for the 
variables force and distance;
2. translating concrete verbal problems into 
mathematical statements; and
3. solving simple equations."
(Gagne 1970, p.264)
Thus we see that by starting with a topic in science we arrive at 
the mathematical capabilities that the student requires. These 
capabilities can then be further analysed so as to obtain a learn­
ing hierarchy for the students' mathematical capabilities.
Notice that in this example, the mathematics is being used as a tool 
in solving a particular sort of problem in physics and so it can be 
specified in terms of particular capabilities,, in this case, the 
capability to "solve simple equations of the form a = b . c to obtain 
value of a" (p.263). Here the approach suggested by Gagne would 
supplement the systems approach to problems where the terminal be­
haviour intended can be isolated. An integration of the two approaches 
would enable the teacher not merely to obtain objectives against which 
the student's mastery of the material can be measured on completion 
of the course, but also would enable the teacher to devise intermediate
objectives and tests to monitor student's progress through the course. 
The hierarchy would also enable the teacher to pin-point particular 
areas of difficulty.
However, before we can accept that such a process will help with the 
problems associated with teaching mathematics as a tool, we must con­
sider how a teacher would answer the question 'what would the student
have to know how to do in order to be instructed in this rule?'. The
question, by itself, does not suggest the sort of answer that is re­
quired, and in particular, it does not eliminate the possibility that 
the teacher could answer by stating what logically precedes the 
particular rule. Now if this were all Gagne intended, then he could 
not claim the resultant hierarchy as a learning hierarchy, but merely 
as a hierarchy that showed the logical structure of the subject.
Thus the hierarchy would simply formalise the teacher's intuitive 
knowledge of the subject. However, it is clear that this is not 
what Gagne intends, and he requires that the hierarchy should not 
show how the various rules are logically related but how they are 
psychologically related in the "sense that the learning of some are 
prerequisite to the learning of others". Yet if this is what Gagne 
intends, he gives no indications as to how the psychological rules 
differ from the logical rules, and hence no guidelines for arriving 
at a learning hierarchy rather than a hierarchy showing simply the 
structure of the subject.
There are further problems in answering the question as to what cap­
abilities the student requires for learning a particular rule. Gagne 
suggests that successive answers to the question will establish a 
hierarchy that not only consists of rules, but also concepts, discrimin-
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tref-
ations, chains, etc. Hov^ , in order for the teacher to obtain a 
hierarchy that includes these various types of learning, he has to 
accept Gagne's account of learning; by himself, the teacher is un­
likely to arrive at the hierarchy, simply by putting down what he 
considers to be prior capabilites. Thus, although Gagne claims that 
he has not produced a learning theory, it is clear that he has gone 
beyond simply describing the conditions under which learning occurs. 
In fact, Gagne's view of learning is based on the behavioural as­
sumptions that (I) all learning is of a hierarchical nature, and 
builds on simpler types of learning, (d-i) that these lower order 
types of learning are part of the necessary conditions for the higher 
order types of learning and (iii) that all learning is ultimately 
based on Stimulus-response type learning. Gagne’s descriptions can 
only be considered within the framework of these assumptions; they 
cannot therefore be considered purely as descriptions of observable 
changes in human behaviour.
5.3 Language 1earning
In describing the conditions of learning in science, Gagne assumes 
that learning is simply the learning of skills, albeit intellectual 
ones. However, while it is undoubtedly true that science students 
must learn intellectual skills, this is clearly not all they learn. 
Toulmin, for example, suggests that the recognition of a common ex­
planatory goal is crucial to the making of a scientific discipline, 
and that one of the things that divides science from technology is 
that in the former case the common goal is an explanatory one, whereas
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in the latter it is the development of skills and procedures, etc., 
to fulfill human needs." (Toulmin 1972, pp.364/365) Consequently, 
since explanation is bound up with language, I think it is necessary 
to consider Gagne's treatment of language learning and compare his 
approach with some current linguistic theories, in particular that 
proposed by Chomsky. I suggest that only if Gagne is able to pro­
vide a satisfactory account of language learning will his descriptions ■ 
of the conditions necessary for learning be useful in solving the 
problems associated with teaching mathematics as a language in science.
Recent advances in linguistics and in the new discipline of psycho­
linguistics have considerably changed the current view of language, 
and have resulted.in an increase in both the quality and the richness 
of linguistic data that must be accounted for in any theory of learning. 
One of the major contributors to this advance is Chomsky, who proposed 
that it is, at least theoretically, possible to construct an infinite 
number of grammatically correct sentences in a language. According 
to Chomsky, a sentence is grammatically correct provided it does not 
contravene any syntactical rules. Hence, although there may be a 
practical limit on the length of a sentence that is capable of being 
understood by someone competent in the language, there is no theoret­
ical limit. In any case, whether or not we would wish to impose a 
practical limit on the length of a sentence, the general point made 
by Chomsky is that a language contains a very large number of gram­
matical sentences and fluent speakers of a language are constantly 
producing and understanding sentences that they have not previously 
encountered. This inevitably creates problems for any theory of 
learning. Chomsky makes the point as follows:
-110-
"We constantly read and hear new sequences of words, 
recognise them as sentences, and understand them.
It is easy to show that the new events that we 
accept and understand as sentences are not related 
to those with which we are familiar by any simple 
notion of formal (or semantic or statistical) 
similarity or identity of grammatical frame. Talk 
of generalisation in this case is entirely pointless 
and empty. It appears that we recognise a new item 
as a sentence not because it matches some familiar 
item in any simple way, but because it is generated 
by the grammar that each individual has somehow and 
in some form internalised. And we understand a new 
sentence, in part, because we are somehow capable of 
determining the process by which this sentence is
derived in this grammar The child who learns a
language has in some sense constructed the grammar 
for himself on the basis of his observation of 
sentences and non-sentences (i.e. corrections by the 
verbal community). Study Of the actual observed 
ability of a speaker to distinguish sentences from 
non-sentences, detect ambiguities, etc., apparently 
forces us to the conclusion that this grammar is of 
an extremely complex and abstract character, and that 
the young child has succeeded in carrying out what 
from the formal point of view, at least, seems to be 
a remarkable type of theory construction. Furthermore, 
this task is accomplished in an astonishingly short 
time, to a large extent independently of intelligence, 
and in a comparable way by all children. Any theory
of learning must cope with these facts The fact
that all normal children acquire essentially compar­
able grammars of great complexity with remarkable 
rapidity suggests that human beings are somehow 
specially designed to do this, with data handling 
or ’hypothesis-formulating* ability of unknown 
character and complexity."
(Chomsky 1967, pp. 170/171) 
Although Gagne has not tried to develop a theory of learning, he has 
tried to classify all learning under one or more of eight different 
types, and describe the conditions under which this learning occurs 
most effectively. Since we are interested in language learning, one 
test of how useful Gagne's work is likely to be can be obtained by 
seeing how well Gagne is able to describe the sorts of learning pro­
cesses that Chomsky outlines. Gagne holds that learning is hierarchical 
and from his eight types of learning we can suggest the following 
scheme by which a child learns a language: By a process of verbal 
association based on Stimulus-Response learning and chaining, the
child learns to construct verbal chains. He then learns to discrimin­
ate between different stimuli and produce different verbal chains. 
Later, by concept-learning, he will learn to make a common verbal 
response to a class of stimuli. This is followed by rule learning. 
Gagne acknowledges the importance of rule learning and suggests that 
in "language learning, the individual acquires rules for pronouncing, 
for spelling, for punctuating, for constructing ordered sentences." 
(Gagne 1970, p.193)
■■We can see that this account differs considerably from the sort of 
outline account given by Chomsky. According to Gagne, the child 
slowly builds up successive capabilities, with each capability re­
quiring certain specific internal and external sets of conditions, 
whereas Chomsky suggests that learning occurs irrespective of parti­
cular conditions. Also, although rule-learning is important in Gagne’s 
description, it comes at the end of the learning process, after the 
child has learnt verbal chains and (concrete) concepts. On the other 
hand, Chomsky suggests that a child must have an innate ability to 
construct linguistic rules in order to be able to isolate words and 
sentences from the stream of speech that he is exposed to. Thus, 
according to Chomsky, if we recognise the fact that language learning 
is accomplished over a similar period of time by all children, then 
it cannot rely on particular sets of conditions; a child must simply 
be able to abstract linguistic rules from the speech he hears. 
Obviously, a Stimulus-Response-type of learning can describe some 
aspects of language learning, but it cannot have the importance that 
Gagne places on it as underlying all learning. We can also show up 
an inconsistency in Gagne’s descriptions of the conditions for rule 
learning, if we accept Chomsky’s suggestion that rule learning is 
fundamental to language learning. Gagne’s conditions for rule learning
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can be conveniently summarised as follows:
"Step 1: Inform the learner about the form of the 
performance to be expected when learning is com­
pleted.
Step 2: Question the learner in a way that requires 
the reinstatement (recall) of the previously learned 
concepts that make up the rule.
Step 3: Use verbal statements (cues) that will lead 
the learner to put the rule together, as a chain of 
concepts, in the proper order.
Step 4: By means of a question, ask the learner to 
’demonstrate’ one of the more concrete instances of 
the rule.
Step 5: (Optional, but useful for later instruction):
By a suitable question, require the learner to make 
a verbal statement of the rule."
(Gagne 1970, p.203)
Now obviously, these conditions require that the child has already
learnt a language, and so these conditions are clearly not applicable
in the case of learning a first language.
Thus, although rule learning is considered important -by both Chomsky
and Gagne, it is treated in a fundamentally different way by each of 
them. For Gagne it occurs at the apex of the other types of learning 
(except problem solving), whereas for Chomsky, it must, in order to 
explain the facts of language learning, be present from the start of 
language learning. For Gagne one of the conditions necessary for 
effective rule learning is the verbal statement of the rule. For 
Chomsky, the child must construct the rule himself ’internally’ and 
prior to language. Therefore, Gagne’s account of language learning 
contradicts the apparent facts that Chomsky draws our attention to 
and this must cast doubts on the underlying behavioural assumptions 
that Gagne’s account is based on.
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So far I have been considering the learning of a first language;
• however, in the learning of a second language, and for our purposes 
we can include mathematics, v;e have a different situation. It may, 
of course, be possible to learn a second language in the same way 
as a first language, but normally the learning is different, since 
.'the linguistic rules of- the second language can be expressed in terms 
of the first language. Here, the use of a verbally stated rule as 
suggested by Gagne, becomes a significant feature. Nonetheless,
I have suggested above that Gagne’s conditions for rule learning 
are not necessary, and it is perfectly conceivable that language. 
learning could occur without the use of explicit rules.
I shall now go on to consider whether Gagne’s conditions are suf­
ficient, and again, I suggest, there are some serious criticisms that 
can be proposed. These criticisms arise when we consider how one 
learns the meaning of words. The only way we can describe the learn­
ing of the meaning of words in Gagne’s scheme is by concept learning 
which occurs prior to rule learning. However, we must remember that 
’concept’ does not have its normal meaning but is given a technical 
meaning by Gagne, so that concept learning is exhibited in the com­
mon response to a class of observable objects. The picture of lang­
uage that is implied by this, where a word is correlated with a mean­
ing which is the object (or class of objects) for which the word 
stands, is, as we have seen, one specifically criticised by Wittgenstein, 
According .to Wittgenstein, in such a picture there is no recognition 
that there is:
”....any difference between kinds of word. If you 
describe the learning of language in this way you 
are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like 
’table’, ’chair’, 'bread’, and of people’s names, 
and only secondarily of the names of certain 
actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds 
of word as something that will take care of itself.’’
(Wittgenstein 1953, 1)
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In the case of learning a meaning of a word, I feel that Chomsky 
fares little better than Gagne. In the later version of his theory, 
Chomsky produces a grammar containing both syntactic rules and 
semantic rules (Chomsky 1965), but it is by no means clear that these 
semantic rules could play any part in language learning, and in a*/ 
case it is generalI.y recognised (for example see Greene 1972, p.72) 
that’'such rules are incapable of completely determining the meaning 
of words, since the meaning of, at least certain words, also depends 
on features in the world as well as linguistic rules. A further 
critique of Katz and Foaor’s theory (see Katz and Fodor 1967), on 
■■which Chomsky based his semantic rules, that makes the use of sem­
antic rules in language learning doubtful, is given by Bolinger 
(see Bolinger 1967).
I shall therefore continue to follow the treatment of meaning developed 
by Wittgenstein, which stresses the relationship between the meaning 
of a word and its use. As we have seen, this use cannot be governed 
by rules, and a person does not learn meaning through learning rules. 
Thus I suggest that the learning of meaning can only be explained 
in certain limited cases by Gagne’s concept learning, and also cannot 
be explained by means of rule learning. In fact, it would appear 
that Gagne acknowledges, at least implicitly, that his types of learn­
ing do not satisfactorily account for the learning of meaning:
"While the learning of verbal sequences, including 
those containing meaningful words, may be usefully 
conceived as a process of ’chaining’, it appears doubt­
ful that this conception is capable of encompassing 
the whole of what is meant by verbal learning. When 
a student ’learns' a chapter in his history text, for 
example, one does not expect him to demonstrate this 
learning by a verbatim oral reproduction of the text.
Instead, one may expect him to be able to reproduce 
the ’ideas’ that are contained in the text in the 
proper order."
(Gagne 1970, pp.147/148)
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He concludes that the learning of meaningful propositions may require 
.a different, internal processing .from verbal learning...
The use of the vague term 'ideaV, in the above quotation, where 
concept in its normal sense would have been equally, if not more, 
appropriate, suggests that Gagne has difficulty in describing the 
learning of meaningful explanation in terms of one or more of. his 
types of learning. For example, he implies that, as he has defined 
the word ’concept’, the learning of ideas cannot be considered as 
’concept learning', and hence that ’concept’ cannot be used in place 
of 'meaning1. Thus, although verbal chaining may be a useful way 
of conceiving the learning of explanations, Gagne admits that it is 
not entirely satisfactory. In fact, I would suggest that verbal
f  '
chaining is an entirely unsatisfactory way of conceiving the learn­
ing of explanations and that Gagne is incapable of explaining the 
learning of meaning and meaningful explanation just because of the 
behavioural assumptions he has made as a basis of his approach.
This inability to describe the learning of explanations places a 
serious limitation on the extent to which Gagne’s ’’Conditions of 
Learning” can help with the problems associated with teaching mathe­
matics as a language for science. Although in the above quotation 
Gagne explicitly rejects the idea that explanations can be learnt 
by a process of verbal chaining, he contradicts himself when later 
considering mathematics learning:
".....mathematics is preponderantly composed of 
intellectual skills and not very much.verbal 
information. Regarding the latter,.....these 
are the items that must be ’memorised’, or : 
stored mainly as verbal chains. But all the 
rest is a set of intellectual skills,,....”
(Gagne 1970, pp.246/247)
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Although Gagne is.using' what appears to be a technical term ’verbal 
information’, with the implication that information can be stored 
(as in files), so that the memorising of information is analogous 
to the filing of information, this technical term can, in this con­
text, only refer to explanations. While mathematics does contain 
what could be classed as verbal information, for example, ’’the area 
of a square is the product of its length and breadth", it also con­
tains explanations.which cannot simply be stored. As Gagne himself 
points out, if these explanations were simply stored as chains, 
then one could only expect the student to reproduce these verbatim.
Now I noted earlier (page 109) that Toulmin stressed the importance 
of explanations, as opposed to skills, in science. If therefore, 
mathematics is to play the role of a language in science, then it 
must play an important part in the explanatory aspects of science. 
Hence, even if we were to accept Gagne’s claim that mathematics 
(that is pure mathematics) is composed of intellectual skills and 
verbal information that is simply memorised (and I, for One, would 
not accept this), we could not accept this in the case of mathematics 
that is used in science. Thus, particularly when wre are concerned 
with the role of mathematics as a language of science, we are con­
cerned with just those aspects of learning that cannot be described 
in terms of Gagne’s types of learning.
In order for mathematics to be used as a language, it obviously 
must have meaning in the context in which it is being used. I suggest 
that in the same way that the meaning of a word cannot be given by 
a rule, nor can the meaning of a mathematical symbol or expression. 
Clearly symbols and expressions in mathematics are defined, by means
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or a ruie, our mis aoes nor aenne rneir meaning,m mat it does 
not define how these symbols and expressions are to be used linguistically 
in'science. It is perfectly true that some symbols are used to refer 
to physical entities, but this does not mean that we can explain the 
meaning of mathematical symbols by ’pointing at* the physical entity' 
for which they stand. To suggest this is again to have a too simple 
view of language, and although in the case of, for example, the sym­
bols ’p' for pressure, ’v ? for velocity, etc., we can point to a 
physical entity, this is not the case for symbols such as =, § , 
etc. Also even in the case of p, v, etc., by pointing to the physical 
entity for which they stand, we have not shown how we are going to 
use these symbols.
5.4 Criticisms of the behavioural framework
In order to demonstrate that the objections I have brought against 
Gagne’s account of learning are fundamental ones that cannot be re­
moved by alterations within the behavioural framework, I shall present 
some of the criticisms Chomsky brings against Skinner in his review 
of Skinner’s ’’Verbal Behaviour”. As Chomsky later explains:
”1 had intended this review not specifically as a 
criticism of Skinner’s speculations regarding 
language, but rather as a more general critique 
of behaviourist (I would now prefer to say ’empiricist*) 
speculation as to the nature of higher mental pro­
cesses .....  The conclusion that I hoped to establish
in the review, by discussing these speculations in 
their most explicit and detailed form, was that the 
general point of view is largely mythology, and that 
its widespread acceptance is not the result of 
empirical support, persuasive reasoning, or the 
abs^ence of a plausible alternative.”
(Chomsky 1967, p.142)
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In the review Chomsky criticises Skinner' s use of the terms ’stimulus ,
’response; and ’reinforcement':
’’The notions ’stimulus', 'response', ’reinforcement’ 
are relatively well defined with respect to the 
bar-pressing experiments (with rats) and others 
similarly restricted. Before we can extend them 
to real life behaviour, however, certain difficulties 
must be faced. We must decide, first of all, whether 
any physical event to which the organism is capable 
of reacting is to be called a stimulus on a given 
occasion, or only one to-.which the organism in fact 
reacts; and correspondingly, -we must decide whether 
any part of behaviour is to be called a response, or 
only one connected with stimuli in lawful ways.
Questions of this sort pose something of a dilemma 
for the experimental psychologist. If he accepts 
the broad definitions, characterising any physical 
event impinging on the organism as stimulus and any 
part of the organism’s behaviour as a response, he 
must conclude that behaviour has not been demonstrated 
to be lawful...... If we accept the narrower definitions
then behaviour is lawful by definition (if it consists 
of responses); but this fact is of limited significance, 
since most of what the animal does will simply not be 
considered behaviour. Hence the psychologist either
must admit that behaviour is not lawful   or must
restrict his attention to those highly limited areas 
in which it is lawful."
(Chomsky 1967, p.147)
This dilemma, as to what is to count as stimulus and similarly what 
is to count as response is clearly one that ought to be faced by 
■Gagne:
"An observer of learning must deal with an input, an 
output, and a functioning entity in between. The 
input is a stimulus situation (S), which includes the 
varieties of changes in physical energy that reach the
learner through his senses. The stimulus situation
is in general....outside the learner and can be identi­
fied and described in the terms of physical science....
The output R, is also in a real sense outside the 
learner. It is a response of a set of responses 
that produces an identifiable product,"
(original italics) (Gagne 1970, pp.33/34)
However, Gagne tries to avoid the dilemma by suggesting that:
"Events in Cthe learner’s) environment affect the 
learner’s senses, and start chains of nervous im­
pulses that are organised by his central nervous 
system, specifically, by his brain. This nervous 
activity occurs in certain sequences and patterns
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"that alter the nature of the organising process 
itself, and this effect is exhibited as learning.
Finally, the nervous activity is translated into 
action that may be observed as the movement of 
muscles in executing responses of various sorts."
(Gagne 1970, p.4)
Thus Gagne suggests that a stimulus is not any physical event that 
impinges on the learner, but one that affects the nervous system, 
similarly, a response is not any behaviour by the learner but one 
connected to stimuli by activity of the central nervous system.
However, as Gagne points out: "The nature of the connection between 
an S and an R cannot be directly observed" (p.34). But, we can 
suggest, if the connection cannot be observed, then the terms 
’Stimulus' and ’Response’ cannot be defined in terms of the connection, 
the connection can only be inferred from observing stimuli and res­
ponses. In any case, I do not think that a definition in terms of 
nervous activity would be of any use since even if this activity 
could be observed, there would remain the difficulty of establishing 
a one-to-one relationship between events in the physical environment 
and events in the nervous system.
The above arguments, I think, support Chomsky’s contention that the 
general use of the terms ’stimulus’ and ’response’ merely give an 
"illusion of a rigorous scientific theory" (Chomsky 1967, p.147).
Gagne’s supposed definitions of these terms by reference to the activity 
of the central nervous system cannot be in fact considered as defin­
itions but simply as expressions of the belief that, given suitable 
developments in neuro-physiology, some neutral connection between 
stimulilS and response will be established. However, to infer this 
neutral connection implies that one can identify a stimulus and a 
response, independently. In fact if we look more closely at Gagne’s 
use of the terms 'stimulus situation’ and ’response’, as opposed to
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his definitions, we see that by ’stimulus situation’ Gagne normally 
means the teaching situation or. a specific aspect of the teaching 
situation, and by ’response’ Gagne normally means the behaviour that 
the teacher wishes to bring about. Unless stimulus and response 
acquire their meaning in this way, independently of each other and 
of activity of the central nervous system, the following learning 
scheme does not make sense:
"Stimulus —— : $ (nothing)
to ' . ' ' ;
Stimulus— •— — -> Response"
(Gagne 1970, p.6)
For, if the stimulus resulted in nothing, then it would not be a 
stimulus. If on the other hand .’Stimulus’ is a stimulus, then it 
must have resulted in something, and so the term ’Response’ used 
in the second but not the first case must be reserved for specific 
sorts of responses, namely those acceptable to the teacher.
If it is accepted that the only purpose served by the terms ’Stimulus’ 
and ’Response’ is to give Gagne’s descriptions the illusion of object­
ivity, then it is clear that Gagne is not simply describing the con­
ditions of learning. In any case, as I have already mentioned, Popper 
dismisses the possibility of simply observing. -Using the term ’theory’ 
in the way it is used by Popper in the quotation given in section 2.3, 
we can say that Gagne is not simply observing facts, but interpreting 
them in the light of a theory of behaviourism. This suggestion 
gains further support from analysing the language in which Gagne’s 
descriptions are given . For example, the conditions Gagne gives 
for ’Verbal Association’ include the following terms: ’chains of Ss-R’s ’, 
discrimination of stimuli’, ’mediating connection’, etc,, as well as 
the terms ’stimulus’, ’response’ and ^reinforcement'. (See Gagne 1970, 
p.141/142)
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By considering Gagne’s use of terras such as ’Stimulus’ ana ’Response’, 
I hope I have gone at least some way towards demonstrating that the 
behavioural directives do not result, or do not necessarily result, 
in an objective scientific approach, but sometimes only an illusion 
of one. As Chomsky suggests, their acceptance is not the result of 
empirical support or persuasive reasoning. Thus there is no reason 
to believe that learning can only be described by theories based on 
behavioural directives, and some good reasons for believing it cannot.
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EPILOGUE
I mentioned at the beginning of this thesis that the results obtained 
from a theoretical investigation could not be the same as those ob­
tained from an empirical investigation. Nor could they be a substitute 
for empirical results. Ido not even wish to suggest that the problems- 
associated with mathematics for science can only be solved by a theor­
etical investigation, but rather that they cannot be solved by the 
sorts of empirical investigations currently used in educational tech­
nology. Thus my philosophical investigation is not a substitute for 
an empirical one, but a precursor. I have not tried to give answers 
to questions, I have tried to show that the questions being asked 
are the wrong ones. For clearly, if the questions are inappropriate, 
then no amount of empirical research will yield right answers. However, 
for someone who expects answers, it may seem that the thesis is ir­
relevant and inconclusive. Yet, until such a person recognises the 
need to look more critically at the questions he is asking and the 
assumptions he is making, there is little that can be said to persuade 
him to revise these opinions. On the other hand, there may be some­
one who recognises this need, but who is not sure what has been achieved 
in the thesis. It may therefore be useful to briefly trace the thread 
of the various arguments as they have developed from chapter to chapter.
The first chapter started from the suggestion that the mathematics 
used in a science should not be considered in isolation from that 
science. By looking at Kuhn’s view of science, from an educational 
context, it was possible to suggest that some of the problems science 
students have with mathematics are due to the different standards
and values expected of them in the two classes. Mathematicians and 
scientists are committed to different disciplinary'matrices, they 
share different forms of life. The science student learning mathe­
matics is not simply engaged in cognitive learning, he is also, in 
a way that is intricately connected, learning different values and, 
in a sense, different attitudes towards his work. Although it is 
generally recognised that science students have attitudinal or af­
fective problems with mathematics, this is too often construed in 
terms of whether or not they like mathematics, whether or not they 
think it is important, and so on. The answers to these questions 
are, I think, totally irrelevant to the student’s major attitude 
problems which, I suggested, arise out of inappropriate values in 
such things as accuracy, consistency, simplicity, elegance, etc.
It is in this sort of area that I feel empirical research into af­
fective problems should be directed.
In chapter two I moved on to look at the systems approach to educational 
problems, and at the assumptions underlying this approach. The systems 
approach is claimed to be ’scientific’, but, as I tried to establish, 
its methodological directives derive from a particular view of science 
This view of science, which originated with the logical positivists, 
has been criticised by many philosophers of science. One of the im­
plications of this widespread questioning of logical positivism or 
logical empiricism is that a scientific status cannot be claimed for 
the systems approach simply because it is based on logical empiricism, 
and that, therefore, the systems approach may be susceptible to a 
philosophical critique. This is just what I have attempted in trying 
to show that a word such as ’understanding’ cannot be replaced by a 
behavioural objective. The idea that it is possible to specify all
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educational outcomes by means of precise behavioural objectives stems 
from an inappropriate theory of meaning, namely the verification 
theory, which in turn rests on a philosophical confusion about how 
we use words such as ’understanding*. If understanding could be 
verified by whether or not certain behaviour was exhibited, then it 
would be possible, and probably desirable, to find mere precise 
specifications of this behaviour. However, as I tried to show later, 
in chapter four, ’understanding* is not this sort of a word; we can 
produce no descriptions of behaviour which, if they occured, would 
necessarily entail understanding.
In criticising the systems approach, I have not tried to deny that 
some educational outcomes can be expressed by means of behavioural 
objectives, nor that thent might be considerable gain from this. In 
particular it might be that where mathematics is used as a tool some 
mathematical skills, required by the science student, could be 
specified in fairly precise behavioural form. A systems approach 
to the teaching of these skills could well result in a considerable 
improvement on conventional courses. On the other hand, it must be
realised that I have tended to emphasise the distinction between the
uses of mathematics as a tool and as a language in order to stress 
that the mathematics cannot simply be replaced by a calculating
machine. In practice there is likely to be considerable overlap
between these two uses, possibly to such an extent that they could 
not be taught separately. In which case, there is the real danger 
that by using the systems approach, the language aspects of mathe­
matics are under-valued.
In chapter three I took a closer look at concepts in mathematics and
science, and at some studies that have been made to describe what is 
involved in so-called concept learning. The assumption made.in these 
studies is. that a word is a label for a concept, so that, for example, 
’energy’ stands for a certain concept in the same way that ’Jack’ 
stands for a certain person. Such studies have relevance to the 
problems associated with mathematics for science since it is thought 
that when a person learns mathematics, he not only learns various 
skills, but also various concepts. It is these concepts, such as 
function, limit, integral, that the science student needs, as well 
as skills such as being able to differentiate and integrate. If the . 
above assumptions were valid we could suggest that some of the science 
students’ problems could be removed as follows: an analysis of the 
science course would show up those mathematical concepts required, 
which could then be taught, in an efficient way, to the student, 
through the satisfaction of various general conditions for concept 
learning. Students could then be tested to see whether these concepts 
had been transferred to the science class, in the same way that they 
can be tested to see whether they have transferred certain skills.
What then is wrong with these proposals? I suggest that what is 
wrong is the particular picture of a concept they are based on. 
Wittgenstein opposes this picture, of a concept word being the name 
of a general attribute or of a class, with a picture of a concept 
being given by the use of a word in a language-game. By means of 
this expression ’language-game’, Wittgenstein draws a powerful analogy 
between speaking a language and playing a game, and one effect is to 
stress that speaking a language is an activity governed by certain 
rules. Two consequences follow immediately from this. The first . 
is that if learning a concept is learning the use of a word in a
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language-game, then the learning of concepts no more involves a 
particular type of learning than the learning how to play games.
In the same way that we do not say that a person is involved in a 
particular type of learning (game learning) when learning how to 
play, for example, tennis, chess, patience, ring-a-ring-a-roses or 
Russian roulette, so we ought not to speak of a particular type of 
learning (concept learning) when a person learns the meaning of, 
for example, energy, table, high, tolerance, derivative. If we 
are tempted to say that there must be something in common to the 
learning of different games or different concepts, then I can only 
repeat Wittgenstein’s advice: ’’Don’t say: ’There must be something 
common....’ - but look and see whether there is anything in common 
at all." (Wittgenstein 1953, 66)
The second consequence is that we cannot talk of transferring con­
cepts if this involves moving from one language-game to another.
Thus although the same words, such as ’function1, ’convergence’,
1J y t  ’\ y  t
’plane’, and the same symbols, such as ’x ’, ^  ^  , are used
in both mathematics and science, we are not necessarily dealing with 
the.same concepts, since these words and symbols are not simply 
labels. The uses and functions of these words and symbols will 
differ in mathematics ana science, although they will clearly be 
related, and, to the extent that they differ, we are dealing with 
different concepts. It is for this reason that the student is not 
simply faced with a ’transference problem’, although this fact is 
effectively concealed, both by an inappropriate and too simple view 
of a concept, and also by isolating the mathematics from the science,
Having, I hope, shown that it is not possible to tackle the trans-
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fererice of concepts in tiie same wav that one might tackle the trans­
ference of skills, I returned to a consideration'of understanding, 
since, I felt, it was only through an analysis of understanding that 
it was possible to get to the root of the problems associated with 
■ mathematics for science. In chapter four, therefore, I developed 
an argument that was introduced in section 2.5 where I denied that 
it was possible to give descriptions of behaviour that necessarily 
entailed understanding. I felt it equally necessary to also discount 
an apparently opposed claim, namely that understanding was something, 
as it were, ineffable, some unobservable mental state. Again using 
arguments first put forward by Wittgenstein, I tried to draw attention 
to the particular circumstances in which we say that someone under­
stands. Just because we cannot give behavioural descriptions that 
entail understanding, we are not precluded from saying that, in 
particular circumstances, certain behaviour counts as understanding, 
that is, is an observable criterion for the correct use of the word 
’understanding’. In trying to find behavioural descriptions that 
entail understanding, or mental states that are the essence of under­
standing, we are confused by the idea that ’understanding’ refers 
to something. To remove this confusion we must look at how the word 
’understanding’ is actually used.
It is this idea,.that ’understanding’ refers to something, that appears 
to have confused Bloom and his colleagues. They recognised that 
’understanding’, is used in different sorts of circumstances and for 
different sorts of behaviour, but construed this as implying that 
there were therefore different types of understanding. Working from 
these assumptions they tried to remove ambiguities in the meaning 
of the word ’understanding’ by classifying the various behaviours.
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There are several aspects of this endeavour that can be criticised: 
first, the failure to realise that the objectives they were working 
from were not precise descriptions of behaviour, and hence that they 
'■were not classifying behaviour. Second, their assumption, which as 
.we have seen was a methodological directive imposed by behaviourism, 
that there is a hierarchical ordering of behaviours from simple to 
complex. Thus they confused an easy/difficult ordering of objectives 
with an elementary/complex ordering of behaviours. Third, their belief 
that they had produced precise definitions of the various terms in 
the taxonomy and that these terms, precisely defined, could replace 
vaguer words such as understanding. Although teachers were able to 
use these terms with a high degree of agreement, this is almost 
certainly due, not to the precision of the definitions, but to their 
having learnt the use of these, terms from the examples of objectives 
that were given. These objectives, as we saw/contained words such 
as ’translate’, ’relate’, ’judge’, which are not significantly more 
precise than ’understand’, and therefore, since the meaning of the 
terms of the taxonomy are based on these words, the terms of the 
taxonomy are not more precise, when applied to the student’s behav­
iour, than words such as ’understand’. (They are, however, more 
precise when used to classify objectives.)
The purpose of these criticisms was not, however, to show that the 
taxonomy was of no use, but to demonstrate how it is possible to 
be led astray by an inadequate conception of understanding. As I 
mentioned the taxonomy has proved useful to teachers and examiners, 
and no‘ doubt will continue to do so in the future, This usefulness 
arises because it enables teachers to classify the objectives and 
test questions they' are using, and thus to extend the types of object­
ives and questions. It does not arise because the teacher is able
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to use more precise words to classify a student’s actual behaviour.
In the final chapter I took a closer look at a behavioural approach 
to learning. Again we saw a committment to certain methodological 
directives: behaviour is described in terms of stimulus input and 
response output, it is built up from simple behaviour, and an inductive 
approach is used, which in Gagne’s case is carried to extremes since 
he claims that he has simply described learning and has not produced 
a theory at all. The. crucial test of Gagne’s work was in the ability 
to describe the conditions necessary for the learning of language, 
and we saw that it did not stand up very well to what Chomsky claims 
are indisputable facts. In complete opposition to Gagne, Chomsky 
suggests that language learning is independent of conditions and 
that it starts from rather than concludes with, the child’s ability 
to learn rules. Moreover, Chomsky's criticisms are criticisms of 
the whoie behavioural, or what he now prefers to call, empirical, 
approach. If these criticisms are valid, then we cannot hope to 
significantly improve a work such as Gagne’s. Instead we must start 
again from different assumptions.
It might be felt that this summary does no more than justify the 
criticism that in this thesis I have not directed my attention to­
wards the main problems: I have not said what understanding is, only 
what it is not; I have not said how we might bring about understanding, 
nor how to decide when understanding has been brought about. Any 
teacher, reading this thesis for answers to his questions : "How do 
I get science students to understand mathematics?’’, ”How do I test 
to see whether they do understand?”, ”How do I know when students 
really understand?”, is bound to be disappointed, since, not only
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have I failed to answer these questions, I have also tried to suggest 
that they are questions that cannot be answered, at least, not in the 
way he wants; they are the wrong sorts of questions. Thus, under- . 
standing, despite (some might say because of) the last hundred odd 
pages, seems as vague as ever.
My answers to such points are as follows. In the first place, I 
confess myself to feel as ignorant as any other teacher when asked 
how, in general, to get students to understand. There is no simple 
answer to this question, and that this must be so is, perhaps, more 
readily appreciated once one realises that understanding is not a 
state, mental or otherwise, which the teacher is trying to bring 
about. The attempt to look for some set of general conditions which 
will ensure understanding, is a misconceived one. The teacher is 
therefore thrown back on his own experience.
A similar sort of reply must also be given to the question of how, 
in general, is.it possible to ascertain when students have understood. 
Understanding is not a state, and hence there can be no formal criteria 
for understanding having been achieved. When a teacher judges whether 
or not a student understands, he is judging whether or not the student’s 
behaviour, in the particular circumstances, justifies the use of the 
expression ’He understands'. The teacher is not matching this behav­
iour against a set of criteria. The ability to judge is not something 
that is learnt in a formal way, it is learnt through learning a language* 
game, which in turn is learnt through sharing a form of life with others.
However, when teachers become educational researchers (and here I 
include myself) they are tempted to ask 'what is understanding?’,
-131-
’what, conditions must be satisfied so that I know a student under­
stands?’ Thus they forget that they have previously judged, on many 
occasions, whether or not a student understands. Where before they 
were able to judge without formal criteria, they now feel that only 
' with■formal criteria, which, moreover, must exist, can certain judge­
ments be made. Only with the aid of formal criteria can one really 
know that a student understands.
This, Wittgenstein would suggest, is a philosophical confusion that 
has been brought about by being misled by a misinterpretation of the 
form of language (see Wittgenstein 1953, 111 and 112) ”A picture
held us captive” (115): the picture of understanding as a state.
The answer Wittgenstein suggests for such an obsession Is therapy, 
and Wittgenstein’s therapeutic method is to assemble a collection 
of what he provocatively calls 'reminders’. "The work of the philo­
sopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose.” 
(127) One purpose of this thesis is to ’remind’ teachers how they 
use the word ’understanding’.
I hope that the usefulness of these reminders can be seen if we return 
to a question that arose in the Prologue: if a student does not under­
stand the mathematics used in his science class, is this because he 
has not transferred his understanding from his mathematics class, or 
because he did not understand in the first place? Now this question 
seems at first sight one to which there must be an answer> and more­
over, one which could,' and should, be answered empirically. However 
this appearance is, I would suggest, deceptive; we cannot arrive at 
a single answer empirically. The reason for this is that the question 
implies a false picture of understanding: namely that understanding
is a state which the student achieves, and, once achieved the student’s 
future performance is somehow guaranteed. The picture suggests that 
we are asking whether the student achieved this ’state' in his mathe- . 
matics class, but somehow slipped from it between his mathematics' 
and science classes, or whether he never achieved this state at all.
The therapeutic treatment required to remove this misleading picture 
is to remind ourselves -what sorts of criteria we-would ..accept for 
saying that the student has understood, and, I suggest, the criteria 
we obtain.will depend on whom we ask. Suppose we ask the student 
himself whether he understood. The answer he gives, will depend, 
perhaps, on whether he had a certain ’feeling’ of understanding, or 
whether he had a feeling of puzzlement, or was able to answer all his 
homework questions, and so on. However, if he said that he had a 
certain feeling of understanding (and we are probably all familiar 
with this feeling) it would be wrong to say he was identifying a 
certain state (say a mental state). This feeling stands in need of 
■outward criteria and, in some circumstances, but not m  others, answering 
all the homework questions provides this criterion. If now we were 
to ask the mathematics teacher, he would use criteria such as whether 
the student had been able to do his homework, whether he asked 
intelligent questions in class, whether he was able to explain why 
he had answered a question in a certain way, and so on. However, 
again the satisfaction of these criteria does not point to the achieve­
ment of a particular state, nor does it guarantee that the student 
will be abletp answer problems on the same topic set in his science 
class. Thus, the science teacher, because he is using a different 
set of criteria again (although not necessarily completely different) 
may well conclude that the same student does not understand the topic 
which the mathematics teacher had thought the student did understand.
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Yet clearly, this difference is not due to any failure on the part 
of the student to ’transfer’ his understanding.
I would not wish to imply however, that the criteria for understanding 
are arbitrary, nor that two people will never agree. Agreement, as 
Wittgenstein suggests, is agreement not only in definitions but also 
in judgements, it involves agreement not only in opinions but in forms 
of life. Thus agreement is part of learning a paradigm, part of a 
committment to a disciplinary matrix. The disagreement between the 
mathematician and the scientist is due to a difference in their forms 
of life, which results in their applying different criteria. Agree­
ment about understanding will, of course, never be absolute, but one 
would not expect the same order of disagreement between two scientists 
or two mathematicians as between a scientist and a mathematician.
We are perhaps tempted to say that the mathematician and the scientist 
are talking about different types of understanding, but to do so, 
again is confusing since it implies that understanding is a state, 
and that different types of understanding correspond to different 
states. All we need do is recognise that they use the word ’under­
standing.’ in different ways, and accept different criteria for its 
correct use.
This now looks as if our problems could be solved by the scientist 
writing down the criteria he would accept for understanding so that ' 
the mathematician teaching science students is able to apply the same 
criteria. This however, grossly over-simplifies the situation, although 
clearly any solution must be something along these lines, since we 
must have the science teacher and the mathematics teacher applying the 
same criteria. Equally clearly, it must be possible for the mathe-
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inatics teacher to learn the science teacher’s criteria, since the 
science teacher must have learnt them himself. However, he did not 
learn them from a list; he learnt them, as Kuhn suggests, by seeing 
examples, by doing problems with pen and paper, by.carrying out lab­
oratory experiments, and so on. In short, he learnt them through 
the paradigms which guide normal science. It is not that the list 
of such .criteria is infinite/but indefinite. The mathematician 
cannot be given it, he must learn the criteria in the same way- 
the scientist learnt them.
This discussion illustrates, I hope, why I feel that a philosophical 
investigation is a necessary precursor to an empirical investigation 
into some of the problems associated with teaching mathematics to 
science students. It does not give any answers, although it does 
suggest the sorts of directions in which to look for answers; it 
does not arrive at any results, but it suggests why one was not able 
to obtain the results one thought one wanted. However, although I 
consider my thesis to be a precursor to, and certainly not a sub­
stitute for, an empirical investigation, I have not set out to produce 
directives for an empirical investigation, and I think it would be 
inappropriate to give specific proposals for further research, des­
pite the fact that there are at least two areas in which I could 
do so. For example, I have suggested that affective problems experi­
enced by science students may well be due to the different values 
expected by science and mathematics teachers, and I have indicated 
the sorts of values involved. I have also suggested that the concepts 
in mathematics and science are not identical,' because of the different 
uses of the same words and symbols in the. two subjects. Thus, two 
lines of research might be tp investigate further these different
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values and different uses of mathematical terms.
Now clearly, I would not wish to discourage research in these two 
areas, but I feel that there.are important reasons why such research 
would not be very fruitful. The problems science students have with . 
mathematics arise because mathematics and science are different sub­
jects, they do involve different language-games, and teachers of 
mathematics and science share different forms of life. One cannot, 
by investigating the different values held by mathematicians and 
by scientists, persuade them both to accept the same values; nor can 
one persuade them both to use mathematical terms in the same way.
The problems will not be solved, overnight as it were, by science 
teachers handing mathematics teachers a list of values they should 
adopt, and a list of ways in which they should use mathematical terms. 
In this sense the problems associated with mathematics for science 
are not problems that can be solved simply by research; they are a 
collection of problems, varying from course to course, from institution 
to institution, showing various similarities and differences with 
each other.
The above two areas are therefore not, I feel topics for future re­
search, but rather, areas for discussion between the particular 
mathematics and science teachers involved on a course. What is 
primarily required is not research into different values and different 
uses of mathematical terms, (although I do not wish to suggest that 
such research is of no use) but an exploration by the people involved 
in teaching, into how their values and use of mathematical terms 
differ. - y. . .jv--;--’
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It is, of course, possible to make a few tentative suggestions as 
to how this process might be encouraged, and these could include 
large scale alterations, ranging from architectural modifications . 
to enable mathematicians and scientists to meet more easily, to 
administrative changes in departmental and inter-departmental organ­
isation. Or they might involve relatively small scale changes such 
as team-teaching, weekly seminars, and mathematics and science teachers 
sitting in on each others lectures and tutorials. However, the 
extent to which students1 difficulties will be reduced by such changes 
will inevitably depend, not on the scale of the changes, but on the 
people involved. No amount of administrative alterations will over­
come suspicion or resentment on the part of the mathematics or science 
teacher who feels threatened by interference with his course. Team- 
teaching meetings can easily degenerate into horse-trading between 
mathematicians and scientists of one topic against another. And so 
on. Nonetheless/the fact that there can be no assured way by which 
the problems associated with teaching mathematics to science students 
can be reduced must not be allowed to obscure an important, positive 
contribution that I hope the thesis has made; mathematics and science 
teachers must begin to share the same forms of life.
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